8 | The
invasion
493.
In its report
on the lessons of the conflict, published in March 2004, the House
of
Commons
Defence Committee concluded that it was:
“… not …
able to define the areas in which the British made specific
contribution to
what was
essentially an American campaign plan, other than in the
consideration of
the
northern option and in niche capabilities such as special forces
operations.” 319
494.
The Defence
Committee concluded that there was:
“… clear
evidence of UK influence on the air targeting operations …
Principally this
influence
seems to have been applied to issues of perception … The extent to
which
the UK
persuaded the US out of attacking certain targets on grounds of
principle is
less clear.
We asked MOD for specific examples of UK influence but they failed
to
provide
any, even on a classified basis.” 320
495.
In the context
of the US system in which the deployed commander reports
directly
to the
Secretary of Defense, the Defence Committee recommended that the
MOD
should
consider:
“… whether
the highest levels of British command structures might be made
more
adaptable …
to operate more closely with their American counterparts
…”
496.
The Government
response stated that the MOD believed “that the
contribution
made by UK
officers was influential in the overall shape of the plan”. It
specifically
identified
the roles played by Lt Gen Reith, the CDS liaison officer in the
Pentagon, and
Major
General David Wilson, the Senior British Military Adviser within
CENTCOM.321
497.
The Government
also stated that it was:
“… sorry
that the Committee has stated that we failed to provide them with
examples
of UK
influence. We provided … classified material at the time … The
Committee did
not
indicate … they were dissatisfied.” 322
498.
The Government
did not agree that command structures should be adapted
to
operate
more closely with the US system.323
319
Third
Report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session
2003-2004, Lessons of
Iraq,
page
5.
320
Third
Report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session
2003-2004, Lessons of
Iraq,
page
7.
321
House of
Commons Defence Committee, Lessons of
Iraq: Government Response to the Committee’s
Third Report
of Session 2003-4, 8 June 2004,
page 2.
322
House of
Commons Defence Committee, Lessons of
Iraq: Government Response to the Committee’s
Third Report
of Session 2003-4, 8 June 2004,
page 7.
323
House of
Commons Defence Committee, Lessons of
Iraq: Government Response to the Committee’s
Third Report
of Session 2003-4, 8 June 2004,
page 6.
89