3.8 | Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003

190. Mr Blair sought Mr Annan’s support for the proposals he was discussing with Chile,

and through them Mexico, to construct “clear and specific tests that would allow us to

assess whether Saddam was going to come fully into compliance and had genuinely

changed his mind”.68

191. Mr Blair stated that the tests would be tough but achievable and the timeframe

could be short: “The US were only prepared to accept a timeframe of days not weeks.

If Saddam did demonstrate his seriousness by complying with the tests then a full work

programme would ensue.”

192. Mr Blair added that President Chirac’s comments “that he would veto a second

resolution in any circumstances would cause a real difficulty if they were proved true.

If the UN could not reach an agreement and military action took place the UN would

be seriously weakened.” It would be hard to achieve a compromise and the US “were

in no mood to negotiate further”.

193. Mr Straw told Secretary Powell that, if Iraq delivered, the UK and US “might

have to take ‘yes’ for an answer”, and that he was reviewing whether to push for

a vote if it would be unsuccessful.

194. Secretary Powell expressed concern about the perceived shift in the UK’s

position given Mr Blair’s assurances that the UK would proceed if there were nine

votes for a resolution but a French veto.

195. In the first of six conversations with Secretary Powell on 11 March, Mr Straw said

that he had sent him the latest version of the UK’s six tests, and that Mr Blair thought

there was a chance it would secure votes.69 He and Mr Blair would be making a series

of phone calls making the point that: “We’ve moved twice and won’t move again.”

196. Secretary Powell was reported to have said that Ms Ana Palacio, the Spanish

Foreign Minister, “was concerned that the Iraqis could do something with the tests: they

could, for example, produce 30 scientists”. Mr Straw responded that if Iraq delivered

“we might have to take ‘yes’ for an answer”. Secretary Powell said that “was easier for …

[Mr Straw] to say than for him to accept”.

197. Mr Straw said Mr Blair’s plan was to get President Lagos “in the bag then get him

to sell the latest draft to Fox”.

198. Raising the question of pushing for a vote “if we knew that would not get a result”,

Mr Straw warned Secretary Powell that he was “increasingly of the view that … would

not be in the interests of international solidarity and respect for the UN”.

68 Letter Lloyd to Owen, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Kofi Annan’.

69 Letter McDonald to Manning, 11 March 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Conversation with US Secretary

of State, 11 March’.

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