The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
586.
The report
concluded with a “note of warning” which indicated that they
were
unclear
about the extent to which JAM1 was aware of the activities of JAM
death
squads,
which were believed to be assassinating their enemies.
587.
On 9 November,
a senior official specialising in the Middle East (1)
provided
Mr Lyall
Grant with advice on negotiations with JAM in Basra, intended to
provide
background
for policy makers as they considered “the advantages and risks of
moving
ahead”.275
The advice
was copied to Mr McDonald, as well as others in the MOD,
the
Cabinet
Office and the FCO.
588.
The advice
opened by stating that negotiations with JAM in Basra had led to
“a
striking
reduction in violence” and that there was an opportunity to
“transform a tactical
deal based
on detainee releases into a process designed to achieve a strategic
shift
in JAM’s
relationship with MND(SE) and possibly with the US and the
Government of
Iraq”. The
senior official anticipated that this would be the subject of an
FCO submission.
There was
“some urgency” to this as by the end of the year MND(SE) would have
run
out of
significant detainees to release, meaning that the current
arrangements could
collapse,
unless “developed into a wider longer term
dispensation”.
589.
The advice
explained the background to the “initiative” in Basra and its
impact
to date.
Around 50 detainees had been released already, with 31 still in
detention.
If releases
continued at the same rate, all detainees were likely to have been
released
by the
middle of January 2008.
590.
The senior
official advised that:
“The best
date for [JAM1’s] release will depend on exactly how the …
process
develops
but Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) and Eid al-Adha on or
around
20 December
represent symbolic milestones. Fixing a date now for [JAM1’s]
release
might take
the sting out of further demands for immediate release and focus
minds
on all
sides on how to sustain the process.
“[JAM1] has
said he does not want all the detainees released immediately to
allow
time for
the transformation of the relationship with the UK. Nonetheless,
despite his
strong
interest in development and politics, his roots in militia violence
are never
far from
the surface and he is very responsive to pressure from JAM in Basra
for a
quicker
pace of releases. Although the atmospherics of the talks are
generally good,
he remains
at times a difficult and unpredictable interlocutor. He wants the
cease-fire
to work but
his instincts are to discipline his own people … He particularly
distrusts
Basra
security supremo, General Mohan … Getting him to work with Mohan or
a
replacement
will be difficult but … [reports suggest] that [JAM1] is beginning
to
recognise
the necessity of security co-ordination with the Iraqi
state.”
275
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to
Lyall Grant, 9 November 2007,
‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]: Negotiations with JAM in Basrah’.
292