9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
emerged … A
number of Sunni groups are involved in sectarian attacks, but
we
judge AQ‑I
is in the vanguard: … its strategic main effort is the prosecution
of a
sectarian
campaign designed to drag Iraq into civil war …
“MNF have
been successful in identifying and killing or capturing a large
number
of senior
AQ‑I leaders … Sustained MNF pressure has prevented AQ‑I
from
establishing
unchallenged control across any significant part of Iraq. But it
has
had only
temporary impact on the level of their violence … Networks have
proven
resilient
in the face of losses of both personnel and material … We judge
that in
many Sunni
areas support for AQ‑I is now well established. We judge this
support
is not
driven primarily by religious ideology. Coercion and intimidation
play a part,
but more
important factors include AQ‑I’s visible successes in attacks on
the MNF
and the
Shia dominated Iraqi government, its ample funds and effective
propaganda
machine:
particularly its achievement in portraying itself as the main
defender of
Sunni
interests against Shia attack …”
693.
On future
prospects the JIC judged:
“… the lack
of progress by the Iraqi Government in delivering any tangible
progress
on national
reconciliation, combined with spiralling sectarian violence, has
helped
bolster
support for AQ‑I. Unless the Iraqi government can convince Sunnis
that it is
genuinely
interested in their concerns, we judge there is little chance of
this trend
being
reversed. A hard core of Sunni support for AQ‑I will remain
irreconcilable,
but some
progress around key issues such as federalism, de‑Ba’athification,
reform
of the ISF,
and the release of detainees could erode support among the
broader
Sunni
population.”
694.
In preparation
for a telephone call with Prime Minister Maliki, Mr Blair’s
Private
Secretary
updated Mr Blair on the continued fallout from the NIIA
raid:
“Maliki was
annoyed about this perceived slight to Iraqi sovereignty but his
Chief
of Staff
has advised us against dwelling on the subject. The MNFI
investigation has
concluded
that the operation was conducted in good faith and in support of
Iraqi
law – that
is, with a view to executing a sealed warrant issued by an Iraqi
judge
in respect
of a suspected death squad leader. But no notification was given
either
to the
Iraqi Government or General Petraeus … because the operation has
been
deemed to
be ‘time sensitive’ by those carrying it out.”366
695.
Mr Blair
spoke to Prime Minister Maliki on 22 March.367
He emphasised
the UK’s
and his own
personal “full support” for Prime Minister Maliki’s government
and assured
him that
nothing the UK did was intended to undermine or challenge the
sovereignty of
the Iraqi
Government.
366
Minute
Banner to Blair, 21 March 2007, ‘Phonecall with
Maliki’.
367
Letter
Banner to Hickey, 22 March 2007, ‘Conversation with Iraqi Prime
Minister’.
129