10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
97.
The NDS set
out the social and economic reforms that the IIG intended to
pursue,
but did not
prioritise those reforms or include plans for their
implementation.50
98.
Dr Salih told
the meeting that this was the first time a sovereign Iraqi
Government
had
presented its own vision of Iraq’s future to the international
community.51
Iraq
needed a
quick agreement on debt relief and faster implementation of pledges
made by
donors at
the Madrid Donor Conference, in line with the priorities outlined
in the NDS.
99.
The IMF and
World Bank presented a “relatively positive” assessment of
Iraq’s
economy,
including higher than expected oil revenues.
100.
At the
meeting, Mr Jim Drummond, DFID Director Iraq, underlined the
importance
of Iraqi
leadership of the reconstruction process, urged faster disbursement
from the
World Bank
and UN Trust Funds, and encouraged more donors to contribute to
them.
101.
The British
Embassy Tokyo reported that the international community had
come
together
behind “a good Iraqi-led strategy”. Germany and France had engaged
“more
than
previously, but not yet with significant support”. There had been
no significant new
pledges,
but that was not surprising given the US$32bn pledged at Madrid and
rising
Iraqi oil
revenues.
102.
Mr Quarrey
described the meeting to Mr Blair as “important and
successful”.52
In
response,
Mr Blair asked for a DFID paper on how the UK could ensure
that the meeting
led to a
visible acceleration in the delivery of reconstruction on the
ground.53
103.
The IIG’s
successor, the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG), launched a
revised
NDS in July
2005.
104.
Section 9.3
describes how, in the autumn of 2004, the IIG and the
Multi-National
Force –
Iraq (MNF-I) reviewed the possibility of further military action to
gain control of
Fallujah
from the Sunni insurgency, including the debate between the US and
UK on
how and
when to take action.
105.
A DFID
official advised Mr Benn in advance of the 14 October meeting
of the
Ad Hoc
Ministerial Group on Iraq that the FCO and “UK military” were
arguing against
an early
clearance operation in Fallujah and for a “hybrid of security
(cordon, precision
strikes)
and political/economic initiatives … and giving these time to
work”.54
50
The Iraqi
Strategic Review Board, September 2004, National
Development Strategy 2005-2007.
51
Telegram
181 Tokyo to FCO London, 15 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Tokyo Donor
Committee Meetings,
13‑14 October’.
52
Minute
Quarrey to Blair, 15 October 2004, ‘Iraq Update’.
53
Letter
Quarrey to Naworynsky, 18 October 2004, ‘Iraq’.
54
Minute DFID
[junior official] to APS/SoS [DFID], 13 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Ad Hoc
Ministerial Group
Meeting on
14 October’.
213