3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
891.
Mr Straw
thought that an ultimatum had “significant” advantages: “It would
indicate
that we
still wanted a peaceful outcome to the crisis; help get the
moderate Arabs on
board; help
our friends on the Security Council; and put France especially on
the spot.”
It might
make France “think twice about a veto”; “they knew as well as we
did that he
[Saddam
Hussein] was only likely to take it [the final opportunity offered
in resolution
1441] when
he knew for certain there was no other way out”.
892.
Mr Straw
suggested that the “clusters” document could be turned to the
UK’s
advantage
by “setting out a few carefully selected tests” and pointing to the
document for
further
amplification. There was a risk that Saddam Hussein might produce
“thousands
of pages of
commentary” and the UK would need to keep the emphasis on the need
for
“compelling
evidence that he was now committed to full and active
compliance”.
893.
Mr Straw
advised that, to “be credible with the middle ground”, his
proposals
would need
“another week or two” to “convince some of the crucial swing
voters”.
In his view, that
might “be possible without disrupting the military
plan”.
894.
On 3 March,
Mr Blair proposed an approach focused on setting a
deadline
of 17 March
for Iraq to disclose evidence relating to the destruction of
prohibited
items and
interviews; and an amnesty if Saddam Hussein left by 21
March.
895.
In a
conversation with Mr Jan Peter Balkenende, the Dutch Prime
Minister,
Mr Blair commented
that “Saddam was still playing around”; and that he was “struck
by
the
parallels with 1997-98”.276
The
“situation would be clearer by the middle of the
week”;
the UK was
“working flat out to get the votes in the Security Council”.
Mr Blair stated
that “a
majority in the Security Council with a French veto would be almost
as good
as a
SCR”. He hoped the French were carefully considering the
implications of a veto.
“Unless
Saddam co-operated in full, the inspectors would never find all the
WMD:
the history
of UNSCOM showed a pattern of Iraqi concealment and
deceit.”
896.
In a
conversation with Mr Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Danish Prime
Minister,
Mr Blair
stated that “the ‘middle group’ in the Security Council was moving
in the right
direction.
We needed to focus on the facts that Saddam had still
not accounted for the
WMD
identified by UNSCOM up to 1998 and no real interviews
of scientists had taken
897.
Mr Blair
also told Mr Rasmussen that he thought the timing “would move
pretty
quickly –
days rather than weeks” after Dr Blix’s report on 7 March; and
that the
Americans
would take action if there was no further resolution.
898.
Mr Rycroft
sought Mr Blair’s agreement to a strategy to secure the
Chilean vote,
adding that
if that was obtained, “we will probably also get the Mexicans”.
President
276
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 3 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation
with Dutch Prime Minister,
2
March’.
277
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 3 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation
with Danish Prime Minister,
2
March’.
341