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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
“Only the Security Council has the authority to determine if, when and under what
conditions the formal cease-fire it declared on 3 April 1991 holds or not.”
478.  Mr Amorim added that members of the Council had been “assured by its sponsors”
that they did not intend the draft resolution “to imply any automaticity in the authorisation
of the use of force in case of a possible violation by Iraq”. Brazil was satisfied that
nothing in the resolution delegated the “authority” that belonged to the Security Council.
479.  Mr Hans Dahlgren, Swedish Permanent Representative to the UN, stated that it
was “very important” that the Council’s responsibility for international peace and security
was “not circumvented”, and that the last paragraph of the draft resolution was “an
expression of the need to safeguard this responsibility”.
480.  Mr Hisashi Owada, Japanese Permanent Representative to the UN, emphasised
that paragraph 3 of the resolution reflected the Council’s wish “to register its firm resolve
that violation …. would have the severest consequences for Iraq” but that it was “not
meant to address the issue of so-called automaticity”; the draft resolution was “not
designed to prejudge the issues of the future”.
481.  Mr Qin Huasun stated that China greatly appreciated “the wise decision made
by the Secretary-General at the critical juncture between war and peace” and that it
supported his diplomatic efforts. He added:
“The situation in the Gulf region is complex and sensitive. If it is dealt with
appropriately there will be peace. Any imprudence, however, may trigger a war,
which is in no one’s interest … We are not in favour of resorting to or threatening
to use force … It would only cause heavy civilian casualties and possibly even more
severe consequences.”
482.  Mr Qin Huasun added that the Chinese delegation had “repeatedly and
unambiguously demanded that the draft resolution should contain no automatic
authorisation of the use of force against Iraq”. He had “listened very carefully to the
explanations offered by the sponsors of the draft resolution”, but they had not eliminated
his “misgivings about the possible abuse of the draft resolution”.
483.  Mr Qin Huasun stressed that adoption of the resolution would:
“… in no way mean that the Security Council is automatically authorising any State
to use force against Iraq. The Council cannot and should not prejudge whether Iraq
will violate its resolutions; even less should the Council predetermine the course of
future action. The Security Council can make judgements and decisions only on the
basis of prevailing circumstances.”
484.  Mr Qin Huasun concluded that Iraq was “a sovereign State and its sovereignty,
dignity and legitimate security concerns should also be respected”. The Security
Council should “make a timely and objective assessment of Iraq’s implementation of its
resolutions”. China hoped that UNSCOM would “complete its task of verification and the
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