The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
disarmament:
“No agreement with US on extent of involvement of UN
inspectors”;
and
•
re-integrating
Iraq into the international community.540
1298.
A number of
witnesses to the Inquiry commented on the efficacy of the
UK’s
post-conflict
planning and preparation. They identified a range of factors
shaping
the UK
approach, including:
•
the
unpredictability of the situation on the ground;
•
the
breakdown in US inter-agency co-ordination;
•
limits to
UK influence on the US;
•
optimism
bias, including the hope that conflict could be averted and
that
any
problems that arose after the conflict could be
resolved;
•
separate
departmental priorities;
•
the absence
of a senior figure responsible for post-conflict planning
and
preparation;
•
inadequate
planning machinery;
•
insufficient
analysis of risk; and
•
a focus on
preparations for humanitarian relief at the expense of
wider
post‑conflict
issues.
1299.
The extent
to which those factors, and others, shaped UK planning
and
preparation
is addressed in the conclusion to this Section.
1300.
Witnesses
told the Inquiry that it would not have been possible to
predict
the exact
circumstances on the ground after an invasion, and that advice
prepared
in
government did not predict the circumstances that did
arise.
1301.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair wrote:
“… the
aftermath was more bloody, more awful, more terrifying than anyone
could
have
imagined. The perils we anticipated did not materialise. The peril
we didn’t
materialised
with a ferocity and evil that even now shocks the
senses.”541
“There has
never been, there never will be, a campaign of any nature that does
not
turn out
differently from what is anticipated.
540
Minute
Drummond to Bowen, 28 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction
Agenda’.
541
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
540