The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
364.
Hard
Lessons explained that
the Working Group’s task was hampered by the
absence of
detailed assessments of the state of Iraq’s economy and
infrastructure,
and poor
integration with other planning:
“The few
detailed reports reviewed by the Working Group suggested that
sanctions
had
significantly limited Iraq’s recovery from the first Gulf War … In
light of Iraq’s
substantial
oil wealth, however, the scope of expected infrastructure repairs
seemed
manageable.
The Group assumed that long-term repairs could be undertaken
and
funded by
the Iraqis.
“With
military, political and democratization plans developed out of
sight of the
Humanitarian
Working Group, its members could consider only in general terms
how
reconstruction
might help legitimize a new Iraqi state. The Group asked for but
never
received a
briefing on how public-order requirements would be met … The
Defense
Department
asserted that it had plans for post-war security well in hand
…”
365.
The UK
Government also made organisational changes.
366.
Officials
began to discuss changes to the Government’s machinery for
Iraq
policy and
planning in June 2002.
367.
Recommendations
to improve Whitehall co-ordination at official and
Ministerial
level were put to Mr Blair in mid-September.
368.
At official
level, the cross-Whitehall Ad Hoc Group on Iraq (AHGI) met
for
the first
time on 20 September. It became the principal forum for
co-ordination
of planning
and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein or post-conflict
Iraq.
369.
Mr Blair
put on hold proposals for the creation of a separate
Ministerial
Group.
370.
On 26 June, Mr
Webb informed Mr Hoon’s office that MOD officials were
encouraging
the Cabinet Office to supplement the Pigott Group with a broader
body
involving a
wider range of departments with a policy interest in Iraq and the
region.211
371.
Those ideas
began to take shape on 8 August, when Mr Jim Drummond,
Assistant
Head
(Foreign Affairs) OD Sec, informed Mr McKane that he had spoken to
Sir David
Manning
about possible changes to Whitehall structures.212
Mr Drummond
explained
that one
consequence of existing Whitehall mechanisms for discussing Iraq,
including
in
particular the Pigott Group’s focus on military matters, was that
“we are focusing
a lot on
military aspects and less on the alliance building, morning after,
unintended
consequences
etc. Come September there may be a case for a tighter grip
from
the Centre.”
211
Minute Webb
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 26 June 2002, ‘Iraq’.
212
Minute
Drummond to McKane, 8 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.
174