6.2  |  Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

Lord Goldsmith’s endorsement of the MOD’s assessment that the US military plan

represented minimum use of force, and a handling plan for announcing the objectives.

466.  Gen Franks told Mr Blair that he expected the conflict to be over in weeks

rather than months.

467.  Mr Blair stated that there was a need for a strategy that destroyed the regime

but minimised civilian casualties.

468.  Mr Blair met Gen Franks on 25 February.163 Mr William Farish, US Ambassador

to the UK, Mr Powell, Sir David Manning and Adm Boyce were also present.

469.  Gen Franks told Mr Blair that threats came, in ascending order, from:

“… the Iraqi Army, which would offer little resistance; the Republican Guard, located

between 25 and 100 km from Baghdad; and the Special Republican Guard (SRG)

stationed in downtown Baghdad to defend the regime itself. In Baghdad, there were

the highest risks of collateral damage and civilian casualties, including those caused

by the use of human shields.”

470.  Gen Franks told Mr Blair that any campaign against Iraq would be “over in weeks

rather than months” and that “the force available was equal to the task”. Resources were

“robust and capable in the west and south, and in the air, and information management

was getting better”. The northern front was problematic “because of the Turks”.

471.  Mr Blair asked if Gen Franks had “any idea” of the scale of likely civilian casualties

and “underlined our preference for a short conflict”.

472.  Gen Franks replied that:

“… during the 43 days of the Gulf War, 3,300 targets had been attacked. Plans

for this campaign envisaged attacking 1,500 targets in the first 96 hours. Some

11 percent of weapons did not hit their precise target. So we must expect some

civilian casualties. But the intensity of the initial attack was key to reducing the

duration of the conflict.”

473.  Gen Franks said that dual-use facilities, where civilians worked alongside military

personnel, “were a real problem”; they raised the risk of civilian casualties and the

destruction of infrastructure that could delay reconstruction.

474.  Adm Boyce stated that civilian casualties were likely to be in the “low hundreds”.

Gen Franks stated that ways to minimise civilian casualties were being explored.

475.  Mr Blair concluded that “we must set out our strategy: to destroy the regime but

minimise civilian casualties”.

163  Letter Cannon to Owen, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting with General Franks’.

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