The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

422. Mr Asquith suggested:

“Sistani – don’t promote UIC alone; caution about large federal region in south;

Constitutional Commission – must be taken seriously (45 percent Shia did not vote)

“MAS – Iran: no friend of yours.”

423. As commissioned by the ISOG, the IPU provided a paper on Sunni outreach, for

the 15 November meeting of DOP(I).196

424. The IPU said that the British Embassy Baghdad had intensified its focus on

Sunni Arab politicians, including those who were believed to have some influence with

the insurgency. Plans were in hand for Sir Nigel Sheinwald to meet a combination of

harder‑line Sunni nationalist leaders and local insurgent leaders later in the month.

425. Sunni Arab demands remained the same: less robust US military practices,

detainee releases and an amnesty; the appointment of Sunni Arabs to the Iraqi Security

Forces; a more level electoral playing field; and a timetable for transition.

426. The IPU reported some progress, both on detainee releases and with the

announcement by Iraqi Defence Minister Mr Saadoun al-Dulaimi that all former army

personnel, up to and including the rank of Major, were invited to re-apply to join the ISF.

The IPU commented that the latter was “a start, but not what former Generals in the

insurgency will settle for”. The IPU judged that more work was needed to encourage

Iraqi politicians to repeal the de-Ba’athification law and abolish the de-Ba’athification

Commission.

427. The IPU commented that it was clear that the US Administration was prepared to

countenance a broad swathe of US and UK outreach activity, but on the condition that

the US should be “careful not to ‘pick winners’”.

428. A Cabinet Office official provided Mr Blair with a Chairman’s brief for the meeting

of DOP(I).197 It said:

“We have made progress since your last meeting … We now have the basic tools

… to run an outreach strategy … But, your conversation with Khalilzad showed

we don’t yet have an agreed US/UK operational plan – we need to fix this.”

429. At the meeting Mr Straw summarised his impressions from his recent discussions

with Sunni leaders in Iraq.198 He felt that the Sunnis now understood that boycotting the

elections had been a mistake, and wanted to enter the political process. In discussion

it was observed that Sunnis were starting to realise that the coalition were “the best

available guarantors of their interests”.

196 Paper IPU, 10 November 2005, ‘Sunni Arab Outreach: Update as of 10 November 2005’.

197 Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Blair, 14 November 2005, ‘DOP(I) – Chairman’s Brief’.

198 Minutes, 15 November 2005, DOP(I) meeting.

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