The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
715.
Mr Chaplin
advised Sir Michael Jay on 9 September that the ideal way
to
meet
Ministers’ demands for quicker results in Iraq would be to put the
new DFID
Iraq
Directorate into an FCO-based structure.394
There was,
however, very little chance
of DFID
agreeing to that. The “next best thing” would be an enhanced FCO
unit and
strengthened
liaison with other Whitehall departments. The FCO would have
to
“rely on
the Sheinwald group [the Iraq Strategy Group] to crack the whip
over DFID
when
necessary”.
716.
Later that
day, Mr Straw approved the creation of a new FCO Iraq
Directorate
as the
inter-departmental body responsible for co-ordinating the growing
volume of
Iraq‑related
work across Whitehall. The Directorate is described in more detail
later
in this
Section.
717.
Baroness Amos
wrote to Mr Boateng on 10 September to request £6.5m from
the
Reserve to
cover immediate further needs in Iraq, and that a further £33.5m
should be
“ear-marked”
for anticipated requirements later in the financial
year.395
Baroness
Amos
stated that
DFID’s budget for Iraq for 2003/04 was now fully committed. Of the
£33.5m,
£20m could
be required for a further contribution to the Essential Services
Plan if US
funding
proved insufficient.
718.
Baroness Amos
wrote to Mr Blair the following day to advise that DFID’s
immediate
operational
priorities were to ensure that the Essential Services Plan was
fully funded
and to help
the UN return to Iraq.396
On the
former, Baroness Amos advised:
“… our
overall approach has been predicated on CPA delivering more than
it
has, and we
have had negligible influence on them, or the Pentagon, to try
and
turn it
around. Immediate measures are now needed to maintain the
Iraqi
population’s
consent.”
719.
The Essential
Services Plan would help to improve essential services, but
solving
the
underlying problems in infrastructure would require billions of
dollars and an Iraqi
Government
to determine policy. Systemic problems within the CPA continued to
delay
the
transfer of promised CPA resources to the South. Baroness Amos
concluded:
“If CPA HQ
and [the] US Government fail to get its act together quickly, then
we can
only plug
the gap if my earlier Reserve claim … is approved.”
720.
Baroness Amos
also advised that the UK’s objectives for the forthcoming
Madrid
Donors
Conference in October were to get the Iraqi citizens in the driving
seat, and to
secure a
“credible outcome on pledges”, which required a credible Iraqi
budget.
394
Minute
Chaplin to PUS [FCO], 9 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Restructuring
IPU’.
395
Letter Amos
to Boateng, 10 September 2003, ‘Iraq Reconstruction Funding:
Reserve Claim’.
396
Telegram 1
DFID to IraqRep, 11 September 2003, ‘Iraq Reconstruction: Cabinet
Discussion on
11
September’.
124