1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
1.
This Section
addresses the UK’s Iraq strategy between 1990 and 2000.
Although
this period
falls outside the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference, events during that
time
nonetheless
have a bearing on the subsequent policy decisions the Inquiry is
examining.
2.
This Section
does not address the review of UK policy on Iraq which began
in
September
2000. That is addressed in Section 1.2.
3.
This Section
draws on material which is in the public domain, including the
Ministry of
Defence’s
Statements
on the Defence Estimates 1991 (Cm
1559-I) and 1992 (Cm 1981),
a paper on
No-Fly Zones prepared for the Inquiry by the MOD in November 2009
and
published
on the Inquiry’s website, the Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass
Destruction
(HC 898) in
2004, and House of Commons Research Papers 98/28,
99/13
and 02/53.
Other sources, including evidence provided to the Inquiry, are
identified in a
footnote
where appropriate.
4.
The Inquiry is
grateful to Dr Hans Blix, Director General of the International
Atomic
Energy
Agency (IAEA) from 1981 to 1997 and Executive Chairman of the
United Nations
Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission on Iraq (UNMOVIC) from 2000
to
2003, for
giving oral evidence to the Inquiry.
5.
The Inquiry
also asked Mr Rolf Ekéus, Executive Chairman of the United
Nations
Special
Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq from 1991 to 1997 (and previously
the
Ambassador
to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva from 1978 to 1983
and
involved in
international negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention and
the
Control and
Verification of the Biological Weapons Convention), whether he had
any
insights or
reflections on the results of inspections in the 1990s and Iraq’s
response to
them; and
for any comment he might wish to make on Dr Blix’s evidence on
UNSCOM’s
operations.
6.
The Inquiry is
grateful to Mr Ekéus for his statement, in which he describes
the role,
methodology
and independence of UNSCOM and its relationship with the IAEA,
and
for
agreeing that it could be published with the Inquiry’s Report.
Mr Ekéus emphasised
the
complexity of UNSCOM’s operations, which he felt had been “missing”
from the oral
evidence
presented to the Inquiry.
7.
Following the
Gulf Conflict in 1990-1991, the UK and the US played a leading role
in
sustaining
a policy of containment and deterrence towards Iraq for the rest of
the decade.
US and UK
policies were intertwined. UK policy evolved through a process of
dialogue
and
negotiation between the UK and US Governments, and, in turn,
between each
Government
and its other partners and allies at the UN, in the region, and in
Europe.
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