Previous page | Contents | Next page
The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
for MND(SE). PJHQ collated the daily MNF‑I reports for the weekly Chiefs of Staff
meeting.
158.  The Cabinet Office was currently overseeing a trial to determine civilian casualties
in MND(SE). The MOD was, however, arguing that it could not provide either the MNF‑I
or its own MND(SE) casualty figures to the exercise, as the US military did not allow
publication of country‑wide information on civilian casualties on security grounds. The
MNF‑I figures would in any case be unlikely to be comprehensive and did not show who
was responsible for civilian casualties.
159.  The UK’s current line was to rely on Iraqi MOH figures, though that might not
be sustainable in the face of increasing Parliamentary, NGO and media demands
that the UK release its own statistics. The current military operation in Fallujah was
increasing pressure on MNF‑I to prove that it was making every effort to minimise civilian
casualties, and:
“There will be seen to be a certain plausibility in the argument that we can only do so
if we can provide credible (i.e. our own) figures for casualties.”
160.  Mr Asquith concluded that any estimate of casualties, other than from MOH and
NGO sources, would have to come from MNF‑I, which was deployed throughout Iraq.
But the MOD had ruled out the use of the MNF‑I figures. If the MOD felt there were good
reasons for holding back its own figures for MND(SE), it (rather than the FCO) should
explain those reasons to Parliament and to the public.
161.  Mr Asquith continued that if the FCO did accept the lead on handling civilian
casualty issues, it should be on three conditions:
“(a) MOD to explore with DoD [the US Department of Defense] reverting to the
practice at the time of the first Gulf War when civilian casualties were released
into the public domain.
(b) If DoD refuses, MOD to explain publicly (to Parliament) why it is not possible to
produce estimates from MNF‑I sources.
(c) FCO to lead on the handling of civilian casualties … But Ministers should
be clear that, in the absence of releasable data from military sources, we
will be heavily dependent on figures from the Iraqi MOH which will not be
comprehensive …”
162.  Mr Asquith advised Mr Straw in a separate minute on the same day:
“Legal Advisers say there are no obligations to report civilian casualties in the Fourth
Geneva Convention … or under any other provision of international humanitarian
law.
“While it is essential in advance of any particular attack to assess the likely civilian
casualties, there is no obligation after the event to make any assessment of either
198
Previous page | Contents | Next page