3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
“We could
also make more explicit guarantees for Kurdish autonomy now and in
any
future
Iraq.
“We should
encourage and support the Iraqi opposition.
“We could
mount a higher profile campaign on the issue of war crimes and
consider
the options
for an international tribunal to try Saddam and his principal
lieutenants.”
“We could
set out a vision of post-Saddam Iraq by deploying a ‘Contract with
the
Iraqi
People’ on the lines of the attached draft …”
289.
The background
to the proposal for a “Contract with the Iraqi People” is set out
in
Section
1.2; the details of the “Contract”, and the subsequent development
of a vision for
Iraq, are
addressed in Sections 6.4 and 6.5.
290.
The letter
reviewed discussions with Iraq’s neighbours about curbing illegal
oil
imports.
291.
Mr McDonald
concluded:
“Regime
change may look an attractive alternative. Removal of Saddam, if
achieved
swiftly,
would be applauded by his neighbours, the GCC and the wider
Arab/Islamic
world. But
previous uprisings in 1991 failed for want of outside support and
military
intervention
for this purpose would be illegal. The US are nevertheless
considering
their
options again. David Manning’s visit to Washington this week offers
the
opportunity
to find out what they have in mind, and to test the viability of
any plans.”
292.
In
parallel, No.10 had also commissioned urgent advice from
SIS.
293.
SIS4
produced three papers, addressing how the UK might divert the
US
from a
policy of regime change, a “route map” for pursuing regime change,
and
an analysis
of the potential risks and costs were the US to take military
action
against
Iraq.
294.
On 3 December,
Sir Richard Dearlove wrote formally to Sir David
Manning
enclosing
three “papers”:
•
A paper
discussed with SIS4 on 30 November which began: “What can be
done
about Iraq?
If the US heads for direct action, have we ideas which could
divert
them to an
alternative course?”
•
A second
paper, ‘Iraq: Further Thoughts’, reflecting discussion at “our
meeting on
30 November”
of a possible way ahead which combined “an objective of
regime
change in
Baghdad with the need to protect important regional interests
which
would be at
grave risk, if a bombing campaign against Iraq was launched in
the
short
term”.
361