3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
376.
Sir
Christopher Meyer reported on 24 July that he had told a US
official that the US
could “rest
assured that if and when the US decided to move against Saddam
Hussein,
the UK
would be with them. This would not be easy for the Prime Minister
politically.”153
377.
Sir
Christopher had been asked about a speech that Dr Henry Kissinger,
the
former US
Secretary of State, had made the previous week, emphasising the
need
for pre-emption
in the post-9/11 world. Dr Kissinger had argued three conditions
had
to be
met if there were to be military action in Iraq:
“•
… a rapid
and successful conclusion – a prolonged war would be
very
dangerous
…;
•
that the US
‘got the diplomacy right’ …; and
•
that the US
arrived in Baghdad with a clear plan for who and what
should
replace
Saddam …”
378.
Sir
Christopher had said that those views “were not a million miles”
from the UK’s;
and that it
was “very important to be able to build a public case for attacking
Saddam;
exhausting
UN processes on inspections; and unwinding violence between the
Israelis
and
Palestinians were part of this strategy”.
379.
Sir
Christopher warned again that, as Sir Kevin Tebbit had picked up
during
his visit
earlier in July 2002, the “buts” in the UK’s “yes, but …” approach
had “less
traction in
Washington than a couple of months ago”. It seemed a given “across
the
[US]
Administration that efforts to get UNMOVIC into Iraq have run their
course …
and that,
with Israel/Palestine, the process … is enough to keep the lid on
during an
Iraqi campaign”.
380.
Sir
Christopher reported that General Tommy Franks, Commander in
Chief
CENTCOM,
would give President Bush his plans in early August. If the
President
was happy,
visible preparations would probably begin in the autumn or early
winter.
The US expected
to secure sufficient co-operation from neighbouring countries
for
military
action.
381.
Sir David
Manning commented to Mr Blair that these were: “Further signs
that
Bush is
impatient to move. Little reassurance on the political
context.”154
382.
In his
press conference on 25 July, Mr Blair stated that he thought it
unlikely
that Iraq
intended to comply with its obligations.
383.
Mr Blair
also stated that the evidence on Iraq’s WMD would be
published
when he
judged the moment was right.
153
Letter
Meyer to Manning, 24 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
154
Manuscript
comment Manning to Prime Minister, 25 July 2002, on Letter Meyer to
Manning,
24 July 2002,
‘Iraq’.
67