14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
1.
This Section
addresses:
•
three
examples of a significant capability gap during operations in Iraq:
protected
mobility,
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and
Reconnaissance
(ISTAR) and
support helicopters; and
•
the impact
that deploying a medium scale force to Afghanistan in 2006 had
on
the
provision of military equipment to Iraq.
2.
This Section
does not address:
•
the process by
which equipment was funded, which is addressed in
Section 13.1;
•
MOD
operational policy or the specific circumstances in which
individuals lost
their lives
in Iraq; and
•
the MOD’s
procedure for supporting those killed or injured in Iraq, which
is
addressed
in Section 16.3.
3.
The Ministry
of Defence (MOD) has agreed to declassify a large amount of
material
for this
Section but there were places where that was not possible for
national security
reasons. In
those few cases, the Inquiry has agreed with the MOD either to
redact
the material
or replace it with a cipher. Where ciphers appear, they will be
explained
in a
footnote.
4.
The MOD’s
financial planning framework for its core budget comprised two
distinct
elements:
•
The Short
Term Plan (STP); and
•
The Defence
Programme.1
5.
The STP
forecast spending on operational costs. Those were predominantly
the
responsibilities
of the Front Line Commands (FLCs). The STP looked forward four
years.
Significant
investment programmes, where a four‑year planning horizon was too
short,
would be
considered in the Defence Programme.
6.
The Defence
Programme provided a 10 year budget to balance capital
spend
priorities
across equipment procurement, equipment support and
non‑equipment
investments.
1
Report
Gray, October 2009, ‘Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of
State for Defence’.
3