The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1389.
The minutes
from the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 10 July stated that
Lt Gen Odierno
had
disagreed with Maj Gen Shaw’s assessment that Basra was ready for
PIC.1276
Lt Gen Odierno
had said that the new ISF structures should be allowed time to
“bed‑in”,
with the
possibility of PIC in October 2007.
1390.
On 13 July,
Maj Gen Shaw reported that Maj Gen Jalil was
taking a “robust
stance”
towards the IPS in Basra, docking pay and sacking police
officers.1277
He
had
also begun
his “purge” of militia elements within the IPS – removing vehicles
and ending
their
employment. In response, he had been subject to an assassination
attempt when
he left the
PJCC.
1391.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Maj Gen Shaw recalled that
Maj Gen Jalil had come
to “the
very strong conclusion – very early” that “the issue here is not
one of training,
nor of
equipment, it is one of loyalty”, and that that was a statement
that resonated very
strongly
with previously held views.1278
Maj Gen Shaw
said:
“… why is
it that police forces in Muthanna and Dhi Qar … operate so
differently to
the police
in Basra when they both had the same equipment and the same
training?
The only
difference was loyalty. It wasn’t a question of whether they were
members
of militias
or not, because … the police forces in Dhi Qar and Muthanna
were
actually
Badr dominated, but … there was unity of command.
“… if you,
as a militia, decided to work with the Government of Iraq, then
that
was fine.”
1392.
Maj Gen Shaw
said that Maj Gen Jalil recognised that the problem with
the
Basra
police force was that it “reflected all the divisions within the
Basra society”.
Maj Gen Shaw
added that “Unfortunately, the same was true of the army as well
and
that was
the problem with 10 Division.”
1393.
Gen Mohan
shared Maj Gen Shaw’s analysis “that the problem was
loyalty”. MNF
received
political advice from Gen Mohan “as to what he thought the
impact of military
strikes
would be and whether they would be good or bad”. That process
generated
optimism
“with a very positive way forward … for a political resolution of
the violence
problem”.
1394.
On 15 July, Lt
Gen Lamb reported that Gen Mohan and
Maj Gen Jalil had given
a “very
stark” assessment of the situation in Basra to the Ministerial
Committee for
National
Security (MCNS).1279
He stated
that Gen Mohan had “an ‘outline’ plan” to rectify
“what he
described as a city without law and order”. He was already
reviewing his initial
assessment
on the early move of British forces out of Basra City.
1276
Minutes, 10
July 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
1277
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 13 July 2007, ‘GOC MQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 13
July 2007’.
1278
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 24‑27.
1279
Minute Lamb
to CDS, 15 July 2007, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (261) 15 July
07’.
378