4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
62.
The JIC
judged on 14 November that:
•
Iraq
accepted resolution 1441 because Saddam Hussein knew that
this
was the
only way to avert a large-scale US-led ground attack.
•
Iraq could
try to overload UNMOVIC by releasing large
volumes of
information
about legitimate industries. It might admit to some
“expendable”
parts of its WMD, but it would focus on concealing
sensitive
items from
inspectors.
63.
In parallel
with the adoption of resolution 1441, the JIC decided to revisit
its July 2002
Assessment
of regime cohesion in Iraq to:
“… examine
how the Iraqi regime is responding to mounting
international
pressure …
[and] assess whether there are any signs of strain within the
regime
and evaluate
the speed and effectiveness of Iraqi
decision-making.”20
64.
In the JIC
discussion of the draft Assessment on 13 November, the point
was
made that
concealment and the retention of a WMD capability “remained a
cornerstone
of Saddam’s
policy” and his intention was to allow the inspectors in and manage
the
inspections
indefinitely as a means of avoiding conflict. But the resolution
put the onus
on Iraq to
prove it had no WMD programmes. The inspectors would need to
be
prepared to
deal with diversionary tactics including lengthy inspections of
sites not
65.
The JIC
Assessment, ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion Under Pressure’, was issued
on
14 November.22
In its Key
Judgements the JIC stated:
•
Iraq
accepted resolution 1441 “because Saddam knew that this was the
only
way to
avert a large-scale US-led coalition ground attack. The regime
probably
believes
that a coalition attack will not be possible when inspectors
are
inside Iraq.”
•
“Iraq could
try to overload UNMOVIC by releasing large volumes of
information
about
legitimate industries. Although less likely, Iraq might admit to
some
‘expendable’
parts of its WMD programmes to demonstrate ostensible
co‑operation
and to provoke divisions in the UN. But it will focus on
concealing
sensitive
items from inspectors.”
20
JIC
Assessment, 14 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion Under
Pressure’.
21
Minutes, 13
November 2002, JIC meeting.
22
JIC
Assessment, 14 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion Under
Pressure’.
303