The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
119.
The lack of
consultation by the CPA persisted, and the paper noted that UK
officials
had been
unable to delay a recent announcement of a new Central Criminal
Court long
enough for
the Attorney General to consider its legality.
120.
It was
expected that the immediate consultation problem would be eased by
the
return to
Baghdad of Mr Sawers, who had been instructed to make clear
the UK’s need
for
effective co-decision-making.
121.
The same paper
confirmed that Sir Jeremy Greenstock would take over
from
Mr Sawers
in September.
122.
The update
also said that a “threat of missile attacks is likely to delay the
opening
of Baghdad
airport to commercial traffic”.
123.
Secretary
Powell raised indications of “British unease about co-ordination
and
leadership
in Iraq” with Mr Straw on 19 June.45
124.
Mr Straw
said that the problems “all went back to our suggestion for an MOU
which
would have
divided the country”. Since that had not been acceptable to the US
“we were
now jointly
and severely liable for everything that went on in all of Iraq”.
They agreed that
a high
level of consultation was needed.
125.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 19 June that despite negative media comment
“progress
was being
made in Iraq”.46
126.
The same day,
Mr Sawers reported that “the security situation in the Baghdad
area
has taken a
turn for the worse” with demonstrations against the Coalition, some
of which
resulted in
fatalities among the US military.47
127.
Mr Sawers
asked for the security threat assessment for UK civilian staff to
be
updated,
observing as he did that “I would not want us to
lose48
UK
civilians before we
apply the
necessary expertise to the issue”.
128.
On 24 June,
Mr Hoon made a statement in the House of Commons describing
two
incidents
in Majar al-Kabir, a town in Maysan province.49
129.
The first was
an attack by Iraqi gunmen on members of the 1st Battalion
the
Parachute
Regiment in which eight individuals were injured, two very
seriously.
There was
then a subsequent attack on the helicopter sent to assist
them.
45
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 19 June 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with US Secretary of
State, 19
June’.
46
Cabinet
Conclusions, 19 June 2003.
47
Telegram
044 IraqRep to FCO London, 19 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Security
Situation’.
48
Read in
context, the Inquiry understands “lose” to mean depart the country
rather than be killed.
49
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 24 June
2003, column 996.
226