6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
“No
strategic issues, that would deny UK the option to conduct a
military campaign,
arose
within the UOR/Operational Sustainability staffing, hence it has
not been
raised at
COS(O) by CDL or DCDS(EC). However, regular briefing has
occurred
through the
established DCMO [Defence Crisis Management Organisation]
process
(Iraq
Stocktakes and through SPG); PJHQ briefings (both at CJO’s Jt
Comd’s
Seminars
and through the range of staff level planning meetings, which
includes
FLC
representation). These briefings repeatedly flagged the
consequences of
defining
force packages without the full knowledge of the impact of the
associated
logistic
and capability enhancements on the basic plan.”
330.
ACM Pledger
added that Adm Boyce “should feel assured” that the DLO
was
“wholly
focused” on its delivery of UORs and would “continue to make every
effort to
synchronise
the delivery of these equipments to theatre in a timely
manner”.
331.
Lord Bach
chaired his first meeting about UORs on
27 January.157
The
points
recorded
from the introductory discussion included:
•
Given that
“authority fully to engage industry had only been received
on
2nd December,
the time scales were challenging.”
•
The high
priority requirements for Packages 0-2 were “capable of being met
by
28th
February”. The “key risks” were now the UK’s ability to “deliver,
fit and train
on UOR
equipment whilst the force was deploying to or in theatre”. In
respect to
Packages
0-2, these risks were considered “manageable”.
•
The
compression of timescales and expansion of Package 3 meant
an
“increased
risk that package 3 UORs would not be delivered before
operations
commenced”.
None of the resultant shortfalls were assessed as being
a
“showstopper”
but “we would only be clear of the operational implications
once
detailed
plans had been worked up”.
•
“[W]hatever
the operational significance of delays in delivering UORs”, it
was
expected
that media would focus on “equipment shortcomings”; being
well
prepared to
win the “presentational argument was vital”. That was not
just
to preserve
the MOD’s reputation, but was “a key aspect of securing
and
preserving
public support for the whole enterprise”.
•
A “key
question for the future” was why the forces “were not better
prepared for
the kind of
operations now in prospect”, given the conclusions of the SDR
about
the
likelihood of operations in the Middle East. The UK “needed to be
more
intelligent”
about its holdings of certain long-term lead items such as
desert
clothing,
NBC filters and COLPRO, and about “the extent to which
equipment
was capable
of operating at a range of environmental conditions”.
157
Minute
PS/Minister(DP) to MA/DCDS(EC), 27 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Op
TELIC UORs’.
51