The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
to
continue, on the grounds that any significant break in food
distribution under the OFF
programme
could lead to “humanitarian catastrophe”.12
33.
Ms Short wrote
to Mr Paul Boateng, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury,
on
21 March to
request £120m from the Reserve for humanitarian assistance in
Iraq.13
That amount
would cover an initial contribution to the anticipated UN appeal,
support
the Red
Cross and NGOs, and fund DFID’s bilateral contribution. Ms Short
stated
that her
bid did not include any funds for reconstruction; those costs would
need to
be considered
in the “longer term”.
34.
On the same
day, DFID produced its first internal update on the
humanitarian
situation
in Iraq and neighbouring countries.14
Officials
reported that DFID had deployed
seven
humanitarian and civil/military advisers:
•
two to
Kuwait City;
•
two to join
1st (UK) Armoured Division (1 (UK) Div) in Kuwait;
•
one to join
ORHA in Kuwait; and
•
one each to
Amman and Tehran.
35.
By the early
hours of 23 March, 3 Commando Brigade had taken control of
Umm
Qasr,
Iraq’s principal port.15
36.
DFID’s
internal update for 24 March reported that the two DFID advisers
seconded
to 1 (UK)
Div were being included in all briefings, and that humanitarian
assistance and
civil-military
issues were moving up the military’s agenda.16
37.
The
inter-departmental Iraq Planning Unit (IPU)17
sent a paper
on UK humanitarian
planning to
Mr Straw’s Private Office on 24 March.18
The IPU
advised that the major
humanitarian
agencies might begin operations in Iraq within 30 days, as the
situation
became
secure. Until then, the “main humanitarian providers” would be the
military, the
Red Cross,
and local staff working for the UN and NGOs. There was “some
capability to
respond to
low intensity humanitarian needs”, but:
“… this
will prove to be inadequate in the event of a protracted conflict
(particularly
around
Baghdad or the North), significant damage to infrastructure and/or
large-
scale
movements of people. The threat/use of CBW [chemical and
biological
weapons]
could trigger a humanitarian disaster … MOD and DFID are
urgently
12
Telegram
370 Washington to FCO London, 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Ms Short’s
Visit’.
13
Letter
Short to Boateng, 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq Humanitarian Funding:
Reserve Claim’.
14
Report
DFID, 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq Humanitarian Situation Update: No 1
(internal)’.
15
Report MOD,
23 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for the Number 10 Sitrep, 0600Z 23
March 2003’.
16
Report
DFID, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq Humanitarian Situation Update: No 2
(internal)’.
17
The IPU was
established in February 2003 to develop policy on issues relating
to the administration
of Iraq.
The creation of the IPU is addressed in detail in Section
6.5.
18
Minute IPU
[junior official] to FCO [junior official], 24 March 2003, ‘HMG
Humanitarian Planning’
attaching
Paper IPU, [undated], ‘HMG Humanitarian Planning’.
10