The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
492.
On
reconstruction and development, the UN was now a “key player”.
UN
development
agencies wanted to increase their presence in Iraq, but with a UN
ceiling of
125 staff
and priority consistently given to constitutional and political
specialists, the UN
could “at
best” accommodate only three development or humanitarian
specialists at any
one time.
The UK also wanted the UN to do more to help improve Iraqi
observance of
human
rights; at present, the UN appeared reluctant to
engage.
493.
The UK would
help secure increased UN engagement through
Ministerial
and
official level lobbying of the UN (to encourage them to play a
greater role), the
US
(to underline the value of the UN), and the EC, Japan and
European countries
(to get them
to lobby the UN to play a greater role, and to fund it to do
so).
494.
In his letter
to Mr Blair, Mr Straw described a transformed UN effort
as “a catalyst
to broader
and deeper international engagement”.285
495.
The second
paper considered how the UK could support transition in Iraq from
a
“primarily
security based coalition” to a broader international
partnership.286
The
UK’s
strategic
objective would be to enable the Iraqi Government to assume more
effective
control
over Iraqi territory and the security, political and economic
agendas. The UK
would seek
to develop a broader international partnership, which would require
improved
security
and an increased UN presence.
496.
Mr Tansley
reported from Basra on 20 January that the situation in Maysan
and
Muthanna
was likely to allow a transfer of security responsibilities in
May.287
Muthanna
was the
poorest province in Iraq but essential services were “adequate” and
“basic
governance
structures” were functioning. Maysan had a weak economy but
enjoyed
better
essential services and more effective governance than Muthanna.
Securing
effective
links with central Government would be critical for both
provinces.
497.
Mr Tansley
commented on the decision not to establish PRTs in those
provinces:
“The
situation … in Maysan and Al-Muthanna underlines why PRTs in
those
provinces
are not required. Military transition will mean no international
staff will
be
stationed in Maysan and Muthanna, and travel there by them is
likely to be only
possible
with military escort (it would likely require a battle group). This
will also
affect our
international partners including the UN … and USAID … (this will
need to
be factored
into our discussions with the Americans on the 2-1 PRT
formula).”
498.
The DOP(I)
meeting on 2 February discussed transfer of security responsibility
for
285
Letter
Straw to Prime Minister, 7 February 2006, ‘Iraq: International
Partnership and the UN’s Role
in 2006’.
286
Paper IPU,
1 February 2006, ‘Iraq: Implementing the Concept from Security
Coalition to International
Partnership’.
287
eGram
1266/06 Basra to FCO London, 20 January 2006, ‘Iraq: Military
Transition in Maysan and
Muthanna’.
288
Minutes, 2
February 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
278