The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
that it
would be more difficult to get clearance for a UK deployment
through Turkey than
for a US
one.
1291.
In response to
a question from Gen Ralston about whether the UK
would
contribute
forces for deployment through Turkey, Adm Boyce said that “the
critical path
was for the
US to negotiate access with Turkey first”.
1292.
On 19
December, Lt Gen Reith submitted a revised paper on the
land options,
to the
Chiefs of Staff for discussion in a meeting chaired by Adm Boyce
the following
1293.
Lt Gen Reith
reported increased US optimism that the Iraqi regime
would
collapse
“early” and a desire to achieve the “closest possible coincidence”
between the
start of
the air and ground campaigns. That would require earlier readiness
for ground
forces.
There was some scepticism about the practicality of achieving a
target date of
mid‑February
in the North, but an attack in the North might begin “much earlier
than
has previously
been expected”, which Lt Gen Reith recommended the UK
should aim
to meet.
1294.
The North
remained the favoured option for UK land operations. Package 3
had
been
expanded to comprise a divisional HQ, two brigades, each with three
battlegroups,
and a total
force level of 32,000. That would mean penalties for Op
FRESCO.
1295.
The paper also
identified an option of contributing a single brigade, of
four
battlegroups,
to a US formation before deployment of the full division. That
would need
about
25,000 personnel.
1296.
In the South,
16 Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade could
initially
operate
under the command of a US division. For the former, units would
need to
be
withdrawn from Op FRESCO. Both brigades were seen as having options
for
war‑fighting
and stabilisation roles. Preparations for the deployment of 16 Air
Assault
Brigade
would depend on a decision not to deploy a division in the North no
later
than 15
January, “the last safe moment for a decision to switch the main
effort from
a northern axis”.
1297.
Lt Gen Reith
advised that a “heavy” brigade could not arrive in the South
before
the middle
of April and further time would be needed for readiness and
integration.
It would
have “particular utility for post‑conflict
operations”.
1298.
If a UK
division was deployed to the North, 1 (UK) Div HQ would take
command;
for other
options, 3rd (UK) Mechanised Division would take the
lead.
1299.
Lt Gen Reith
also recorded that he had been directed to add 42 Commando
and
HQ 3
Commando Brigade to the Amphibious Task Group.
489
Minute
Reith to CDS & various, 19 December 2002, ‘Land Options Paper –
Revised’ attaching Paper
CJO, ‘Land
Options – Revised’.
366