1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
“Throughout
the dispute, our aim has been a peaceful, diplomatic settlement.
There
was no
desire on either side of the Atlantic to use force, but it was also
clear to us
throughout
that Saddam Hussein only understands and respects force
…
“… As Kofi
Annan said in Baghdad: ‘You can achieve much by diplomacy, but
you
can achieve
a lot more when diplomacy is backed by firmness and
force.’
“I would
put it this way: with Saddam, diplomacy plus force equals
success.”190
“Saddam
Hussein has spent seven years playing for time, but has been
thwarted
by the
resolve of the international community. It is now clearer than ever
that his
games have
to stop once and for all. If they do not, the consequences should
be
463.
Mr Campbell
recorded that, when Cabinet discussed Iraq on
26 February,
Mr Cook
said there were “really worrying signs about what UNSCOM can do. We
were
pursuing
a twin track approach – light at the end of the tunnel on
sanctions, allied to
clear
warnings if Saddam breaks the agreement.”192
Mr Blair
said “he was assured
by
[President] Chirac he agrees the language makes clear military
action will follow if
Saddam
breaks the agreement.”
464.
On
2 March, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution
1154 (1998).193
It:
•
endorsed
the MOU of 23 February and looked forward to its full
implementation;
•
stressed
the need for Iraq to comply with its obligations to provide
access
to UNSCOM
and the IAEA which was necessary for the implementation
of
resolution
687;
•
stated that
“any violation would have severest consequences for
Iraq”;
•
reaffirmed
its intention to act in accordance with the relevant provisions
of
resolution
687 on the duration of prohibitions (sanctions);
•
noted that
Iraq’s failure to comply with the relevant obligations had delayed
that
action;
and
•
decided,
“in accordance with its responsibility under the Charter, to
remain
actively
seized of the matter, in order to ensure the implementation of
this
resolution,
and to secure peace and security in the area”.
465.
It is clear
from the statements in the Council meeting on 2 March, made
before and
after the
vote, including from seven States who were not members of the
Council, that
190
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
24 February 1998, columns 174-175.
191
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
24 February 1998, column 176.
192
Campbell A
& Stott R. The Blair
Years: Extracts from the Alastair Campbell Diaries.
Hutchinson, 2007.
193
UN Security
Council resolution 1154 (1998).
107