10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
162.
Section 9.3
describes the impact of operations in Fallujah on security and
the
political
process.
163.
Five months
later, on 12 May, the British Embassy Baghdad reported that
Embassy
staff had
visited Fallujah, hosted by US forces.93
The scale
of destruction was apparent,
but there
was also progress:
•
Between
90,000 and 150,000 of Fallujah’s estimated 240,000
inhabitants
had returned.
•
All water
treatment plants, tanks and pipes had been restored and two
new
pumping
facilities had been installed.
•
Electricity
had been restored to between 80 and 100 percent of the
main
residential
area, but only to between 0 and 40 percent of the “industrial
south”.
•
Of the
city’s 69 schools, 38 were open and 15 would open by the end of
the
month.
“Huge progress” had been made in restoring healthcare.
164.
The Embassy
commented:
“This may
be an over-rosy view of developments in Fallujah, it was a
determined
PR [public
relations] effort, but the signs of life around the town spoke
volumes.
Likewise,
the prominence of Iraqis throughout the visit and US willingness to
let
them lead
was not what we had expected. Congratulations to the US
Marines!”
In late
January 2005, Dr Greenall and another DFID-funded consultant
visited Najaf to
review
progress since the US intervention in August 2004 and to identify
lessons for future
Their
assessment was more positive than the Cabinet Office paper of 22
October 2004.
The
consultants reported that although the short conflict had resulted
in considerable
damage,
there was a “permissive environment” on the streets. That could be
attributed
largely to
an effective post-conflict assistance strategy: US$48m had been
allocated
for projects
and “social payments”, with 156 projects being completed in the
first
100 days after
the uprising. Funding had come from CERPs, PCO funds
re-directed
away from
large infrastructure projects, and USAID. The impact on the local
economy
had been
substantial.
A key
strength of the US military’s approach had been to engage directly
with the
Provincial
Governor and the Mayor to ensure local ownership. The Governor
remained
frustrated,
however, by the level of support from the Iraqi
Government.
93
Telegram
4393/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 12 May 2005, ‘Impressions of
Fallujah: 12 May’.
94
Telegram 85
Baghdad to FCO London, 3 February 2005, ‘Iraq: Post-Conflict
Reconstruction Lessons
from
Najaf’.
223