The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
32.
General Sir
Michael Walker, Chief of the General Staff, noted that the new plan
still
had to
constitute “a winning concept”.
33.
Mr Paul
Johnston, Head of FCO Security Policy Department, reported
the
developments
to the Private Office of Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign
Secretary.8
34.
Mr Johnston
recorded that there was still some possibility that Turkey might
say
yes to land
forces at the “last moment”. In response to concern from Gen Walker
that,
if Saddam
Hussein thought there would be no attack from the North he might
move his
more
effective troops to the South, Mr Johnston had suggested it would
be helpful for
Turkey to
retain “constructive ambiguity” to keep the pressure on Saddam
Hussein
“and thus
make a military option in practice less likely”. Adm Boyce had
“strongly
agreed” and
stated that the point should be included in the briefing for Mr
Geoff Hoon,
the
Defence Secretary.
35.
Mr Johnston
wrote that the three brigades “would be ready for action by 10
March”.
That
reflected US planning assumptions of an “air campaign beginning on
3 March and
the land
campaign on 19 March”. The MOD’s initial assessment was that the
southern
option
offered “significant strategic exposure with minimum military risk.
The Iraqi forces
likely to
be confronted were ‘incapable of manoeuvre’ and morale was assessed
to
be
low.”
36.
Mr Johnston
commented that Sir Kevin Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under
Secretary
(PUS), and
Gen Walker:
“… both
noted that the southern option for the UK was part of an overall
concept
significantly
different to that on which Ministers had so far been
consulted.”
37.
Mr Johnston
added that the MOD would “make a strategic assessment of the
pros
and cons
before the next Chiefs’ meeting, to inform the consequent advice to
Ministers”.
38.
Mr Jim
Drummond, Assistant Head (Foreign Affairs) of the Cabinet Office
Overseas
and Defence
Secretariat (OD Sec), reported to Sir David Manning, Head of OD Sec
and
Mr Blair’s
Foreign Policy Adviser:
“All of
this was new to the Chiefs but greeted with some enthusiasm. They
saw
advantages
in a relatively discrete UK operation with fewer risks than the
northern
route. The
UK would be well placed for the transition to Phase IV
(peacekeeping)
and in
control of Iraq’s access to the sea and 75 percent of its oil. The
disadvantages
were also
that the UK could be left in an area with lots of media attention
and sitting
on the oil
fields so vulnerable to the charge that we were only in it for the
oil.”9
39.
A paper from
Lt Gen Reith submitted after the discussion reported that Lt
Gen
McKiernan
lacked combat power in the South during the early stages of the
campaign
8
Minute
Johnston to Private Secretary [FCO], 6 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Chiefs
of Staff Meeting, 6 January’.
9
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 7 January 2003, ‘Chiefs
of Staff Meeting’.
392