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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
328.  Sir David did not send a report of his conversation to the FCO.
Sir Christopher Meyer’s advice, 5 and 6 September 2002
329.  Sir Christopher Meyer reported on 5 September that the US Administration was
considering starting to make the case against Saddam Hussein and using President
Bush’s speech at the UN to indict him then circulating a draft resolution the following
week. Congressional resolutions authorising military action would be sought in
early October.107 The US was also thinking about a further resolution at a date to be
determined which would issue a 48 hour ultimatum before military action was taken.
330.  Sir Christopher added that there was still “feverish debate” about the content of
the first resolution, and in particular how to secure intrusive inspections and whether to
expand the case against Saddam beyond WMD. A study to be released on 6 September
would suggest an “Inspection Implementation Force” to be established in neighbouring
countries. Other options were also being considered although any option was likely to be
unacceptable to Iraq. One official had commented: “but that was the whole point”.
331.  Sir Christopher reported that he had made clear that the UK view was that the
focus had to remain squarely on the WMD threat, but there were two US concerns about
that approach. First, the intelligence was not substantial enough to make a convincing
case that regime change was necessary and justified. American public opinion would
need something more; issues like human rights would play well. Secondly, there was
concern that, if the focus was only on WMD and Saddam Hussein folded at the eleventh
hour, it would undercut the imperative for regime change.
332.  Sir Christopher Meyer advised on 6 September that Iraq was likely to
dominate Washington politics during the autumn and there was a raft of
unanswered questions about a “UN route”.
333.  Sir Christopher warned that it was “far from a given” that the “UN process
should be exhausted, as we would understand it, before military action is
contemplated”.
334.  Sir Christopher suggested that it would be more important to get it right than
to do it fast.
335.  Before the meeting at Camp David, Sir Christopher Meyer advised that, while
President Bush’s decision to go the UN route and to consult widely at home and abroad
was welcome it left “a raft of questions unanswered”.108
107 Telegram 1130 Washington to FCO London, 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq: The US Diplomatic Game Plan’.
108 Telegram 1140 Washington to FCO London, 6 September 2002, ‘PM’s visit to Camp David: Iraq’.
152
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