The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
353.
Mr Straw
reassured Secretary Powell that, since their first conversation,
Mr Simon
McDonald,
his Principal Private Secretary, had spoken to Sir Jeremy “to ask
him to
push but
not too hard”. In the light of Secretary Powell’s continuing
concern, Mr Straw
“repeated
that there was only a one percent chance of success but it gave us
room to
make the
case here”.
354.
Separately,
Mr Straw spoke to Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who was with
Ambassador
Negroponte,
to ask him “not formally to introduce anything this afternoon but
to say that
we were
consulting about the six tests which had already been made
public”.
355.
Mr Brenton
reported that the US Administration’s “impatience” was “growing
over
the delay
at the UN”, and that:
•
“However
much they want to help us obtain UN backing, they are
equally
determined
to get on with the job of tackling Saddam. Minds are
increasingly
moving in
the direction of abandoning the diplomatic pursuit of the
‘undecided
six’, and
focusing instead on firming up a coalition of the
willing.”
•
The latest
opinion polls showed “increased impatience with the UN process,
with
some 55
percent … prepared to support a war without a new UNSCR. Chirac
in
particular
is seen as the villain of the piece for threatening an unreasonable
veto
under all
circumstances.”
•
A White
House spokesman had told the daily press conference that
President
Bush “was
confident that the UK would be with the US in the endeavour
to
disarm
Saddam from a military point of view”.115
356.
Mr Brenton
had been told by senior US officials that President Bush would
have
washed his
hands of the Security Council long ago, but he was determined
that,
whatever,
“within reason”, Mr Blair needed, he should get. That included
the possibility
of UN
discussions continuing into the following week if necessary. It did
not, however,
extend to
movement on the operational timetable. He had been advised that
there
was no US
willingness to shift the dates to assist a process which seemed to
be
going nowhere.
357.
At the request
of Malaysia, representing the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
the
Security
Council held an open debate on the “situation between Iraq and
Kuwait” on
11 and
12 March.116
More than
50 speakers contributed to the debate, but no member
of the
Council spoke.
115
Telegram
328 Washington to FCO London, 12 March 2003,
‘US/Iraq’.
116
UN Security
Council, ‘4717th Meeting Tuesday 11 March 2003’
(S/PV.4717).
460