The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
483.
Clothing
issued to 3 Commando and 16 Air Assault Brigades was deteriorating,
so
they would
require an additional 10,000 replacement suits. Those would be
dispatched
to theatre
at the beginning of May. Other formations would also require
maintenance
stocks.
484.
Adm Boyce
was advised that 12 months was “a realistic minimum lead time
to
allow for
normal contracting processes” for desert clothing. Advice had been
provided in
September
2002 that the decision point for ordering clothing was
1 October with the “risk
of
shortages increasing thereafter”. That risk had been “deemed to be
acceptable” and
permission
was not given to approach industry until
4 December.
485.
In
Mr Flaherty’s note to Lord Bach on 9 May addressing
equipment performance,
he
summarised the position on desert clothing and boots
as:
“The
shortage of desert clothing was caused primarily by the fact that
the stocks
held were
insufficient for the speed and size of this deployment. The
inability to
equip even
all fighting formations prior to the start of combat operations was
caused
by in
theatre supply priorities. The weakness of the asset tracking
system meant
there was
limited visibility outside theatre of these problems. During
decisive combat
operation
the shortage of desert combats was not flagged up since it was not
seen
to have a
serious operational impact. Sufficient desert combats have now
been
dispatched
to theatre to meet previously declared shortfalls.”237
486.
Mr Flaherty
added that after combat operations ended, the shortage of
clothing
was having
“a negative impact on morale” and had therefore been flagged as a
concern.
He wrote
that “excess stocks” were “now held centrally in theatre” and units
could call on
these
stocks “as required to top up holdings”.
487.
Following the
invasion, Brig Cowlam wrote:
“… the saga
of desert combat clothing where the UOR failed to meet
the
requirement
indicates that risks that had been taken could not be
recovered.”238
488.
On
31 August 2010, an analysis of the land operation in Iraq was
published on
behalf of
the Chief of the General Staff by Brigadier Ben Barry. It was known
as “the
489.
The report
stated: “Desert boots, desert uniforms and body armour were all
in
short supply.”
490.
The NAO’s
report on 11 December 2003 stated that the procurement of
desert
clothing
and boots was regarded as “of limited effectiveness because few
troops
237
Minute PJHQ
Civ Sec to PS/Minister(DP), 9 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC
UORs’.
238
Report
Cowlam, 12 May 2003, ‘Operation TELIC – Joint Force Logistic
Component (JFLOGC)
Jan – May
2003 Post Operation Report’.
239
Report Land
Command, 31 August 2010, ‘Operations in Iraq: An Analysis From
a Land Perspective’.
78