The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
the
necessary time to exhaust all avenues of dialogue with the
Sunnis …
We
also
needed to
set out a package of reconstruction measures.” 74
133.
Following
authorisation by Prime Minister Allawi, offensive operations began
in
Fallujah on
8 November.75
134.
Mr Chaplin
described the UK’s involvement in that decision for the
Inquiry:
“Our main
involvement and the main thing we emphasised afterwards was that
if
there had
to be military action, then the [Iraqi] Government needed to
organise itself
to ensure
there was rapid follow-up, looking after displaced people,
returning them
as soon as
possible, looking after the humanitarian aspects. And the part of
the
DFID team
that was working closely with the Ministry of Health was heavily
involved
135.
Mr Benn
replied to Mr Blair’s letter of 26 October on 10
November.77
He
wrote:
“I share
many of your concerns about the pace of reconstruction and
development in
Iraq.
However, we should take encouragement from the Iraqi Interim
Government’s
National
Development Strategy, the extra resources (about US$3bn) that the
high oil
price gives
them, and the new arrangements that Allawi is making in his own
office,
with DFID
advice, to lead reconstruction …
“Security
is much more difficult than we anticipated and is getting worse
around
Baghdad.
Many contractors, including those that we regularly use to work
in
post‑conflict
environments such as Crown Agents, are unwilling to send staff
outside
Baghdad or
Basra at present. This is affecting all donors. But we can do more.
Our
£6m
employment generation project will start to create jobs this month
… I have
also
allocated £10m to support essential services – water, sanitation
and power – in
South-Eastern
Iraq. We will top this up if necessary. We are working closely with
UK
forces:
DFID’s technical expertise is available to help them implement
their Quick
Impact
Projects, and military liaison teams will help us to make our
projects happen.
We will
talk to MOD about resources, as we look for other ways to maximise
impact.”
136.
Mr Benn
also highlighted DFID’s support for the elections, and his decision
not to
channel
further funds through the UN and World Bank Trust
Funds.
74
Letter
Phillipson to Adams, 5 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Discussion with Iyad Allawi,
5 November
2004’.
75
CNN
World, 9 November
2004, Battle for
Falluja under way.
76
Public
hearing, 7 December 2010, page 19.
77
Letter Benn
to Blair, 10 November 2004, [untitled].
218