6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
In response
to resolution 1441, Iraq submitted a declaration of its WMD and
missile
programmes
on 7 December.
The
evaluation of the declaration is addressed in Sections 3.6 and
4.3.
1165.
Mr Blair
was advised on 11 December that there was impatience in the
US
Administration
and it “looked intent on military action in
February/March”.
1166.
Sir David
Manning and Sir Richard Dearlove had a joint meeting with
Dr Rice and
Mr George
Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, in Washington on 9
December.455
1167.
Sir David
reported to Mr Blair that Dr Rice had “made no effort to
hide the fact
that the
Administration would now be looking to build the case for early
military action …
probably
mid/late February as we suspected”. But she had “denied that
military planning
was
dictating the timetable”.
1168.
Mr Blair
agreed that visible preparations for military action could begin
in
January
2003.
1169.
Mr Blair,
Mr Hoon, Adm Boyce, Sir David Manning and
Sir Richard Dearlove met
1170.
In relation to
military planning and the issues raised in Mr Watkins’ letter
of
5 December,
Mr Rycroft recorded that:
•
Mr Hoon
and Adm Boyce had “updated” Mr Blair “on US and UK
military
planning,
including on the need to align the readiness of US and UK
forces”.
•
Mr Blair
“was content that military preparations from January would
become
increasingly
visible. These should be presented as sensible
contingency
preparations
against the possibility that Iraq would not comply
with
UNSCR 1441.”
1171.
The record of
the meeting does not refer to any discussion of the options if
Turkey
refused
transit for UK land forces.
1172.
In his
diaries, Mr Campbell wrote:
“We went
over the various military options. It would be possible to do
something
fairly
quickly but TB didn’t believe GWB wanted ‘an ugly start’ … Geoff
was very
455
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq’.
456
Letter
Rycroft to Watkins, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Preparations’.
351