6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
be “in for
a long and expensive negotiation” and it was clear that the US
priority would
be “to
secure basing” for its “own ground forces”.
1059.
Mr Hoon
believed that the UK should “up the ante” with the US, and: “Press
for
clarity on
the Turkish position, one way or the other …”
1060.
Mr Hoon
wanted Sir David Manning to:
“…
reinforce with Condi Rice the need for the President to try to
unblock this. If we
do have to
fall back on a southern role we should try to ensure that it is as
part of the
main effort
rather than as follow‑on forces.”
1061.
Addressing UK
military preparations, Mr Watkins wrote that the option of a
military
campaign
launched on 6 January 2003 seemed to have “effectively lapsed” and
the
timelines
were “uncertain”. The US military position was described as “get
ready, but
not too
ready”, because they did “not want to bring too large a force to
too high a pitch
of readiness”.
1062.
Mr Hoon
recommended continuing with military preparations to keep
options
open, and
suggested that the debate in the House of Commons on 25
November
provided an
opportunity to make some public reference to them.
1063.
There was “a
sense in the US” of “two broad timelines in play, implying
two
different
plans”. The first was a “high‑impact event to which the US might
feel the
need to
respond quickly at short notice”. The second was a decision that a
material
breach had
occurred which would be followed by a “more deliberative
build‑up
to military
action”.
1064.
Each scenario
was “problematic”:
•
The first
would effectively hand the initiative to Saddam Hussein; it
might
provoke a
rapid response, but that could not be decisive because it could
not
involve
sufficient land forces to take control of Iraq, “unless … it leads
… to
regime
collapse, a scenario in which the US seem to invest quite a lot of
hope”.
•
The second
would give Saddam Hussein time which he “might be able
to
exploit
diplomatically and militarily”. A deliberate campaign “would
require some
60‑90 days’
build‑up, and the time will soon come when the question has
to
be
confronted of whether it is sensible to contemplate fighting in the
summer”.
A “common
understanding” needed to be reached with the US and
plans
“shaped
accordingly”.
1065.
Addressing the
issue of “Timetable and Triggers”, Mr Watkins
wrote:
“To some
extent, triggers are now under Saddam’s control and so cannot be
slotted
into any
firm timetable. Moreover, what constitutes a ‘violation’ and/or
‘material
breach’
remains undefined: many in the US are reduced to saying ‘we’ll know
when
we see it’,
which is not a suitable base for planning.”
335