The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Visible
international
commitment, in context
of 2006 partnership with Iraq.”228
485.
The IPU hoped
that it might be possible for an Iraqi government to be formed
by
the end of
January, six weeks after the election.
486.
At DOP(I) on
20 December, Mr Patey cautioned that there could be a
tension
between the
desire for a representative and effective government and the hope
that it
could be
achieved rapidly.229
If that
were the case, he judged that a representative and
effective
government would be more important than speed.
487.
Mr Blair
told DOP(I) that he had discussed US/UK engagement in forming the
new
government
with President Bush. They were agreed that full engagement was
necessary
and
legitimate. Ambassador Khalilzad and Mr Patey:
“… should
be clear that they had a mandate to send a tough message to the
Iraqis,
particularly
to the Kurds, about our expectation that they should use their
bargaining
power to
push for a moderate, centrist government. Our support for them
rested on
them doing
so.”
488.
In a paper on
the handover of security responsibility, the MOD reported that
the
development
of the ISF was “broadly on track”. The two key challenges
remained
agreeing
what the role of the Iraqi Government should be in defining the
handover plan;
and the
capacity of the Iraqi administration and Security Forces to assume
responsibility,
given the
risk of increasing sectarianism and militia
infiltration.230
489.
Lt Gen
Houghton spoke to the MOD paper at the meeting.231
He reported
that the
development
of the ISF in southern Iraq was “going well”. The Iraqi Army in
particular
had
progressed well although they would need support for another year
and further work
was needed
on counter-insurgency operations and logistics. Police capacity
lagged
behind, as
per the original US military plan for ISF development.
490.
The record of
Mr Blair’s video conference with President Bush on 20
December
shows that
Mr Blair argued that communication with the Sunni community
needed
to
continue: “We needed a sense that we were starting to split people
away from
491.
Mr Blair
suggested that a reduction in the level of violence would have a
dramatic
political
impact and that it was important to “set out the forward
perspective” on security,
in order to
“cement the changes brought by the election”.
228
Paper IPU,
16 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Post-Election: UK Work Plan’.
229
Minutes, 20
December 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
230
Paper MOD,
[undated], ‘Ensuring the Iraqis are Ready for a Handover of
Security Responsibility’.
231
Minutes, 20
December 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
232
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 20 December 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush: Middle East
Issues’.
570