The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Facilities
“formerly
associated with Iraq’s chemical warfare programme
at …
Habbaniyah” were
“being
reconstructed”. There were
signs of “renewed
activities”
but “no firm evidence” that activity was “chemical weapons related,
or
of the
precursor plant which would be needed to produce CW
agent”.
•
Iraq was
“restoring its civil chemical production capability, including
pesticides”
and the JIC
assessed that “would help any revival of its CW
programme”.
•
Iraq “could
be modifying bombs […] aerial bombs, procured in the
1980s,
for
delivery of chemical warfare agents […] a significant advance in
Iraqi
development
of a binary type munition”.
•
The JIC
judged that Iraq was “likely to be continuing to develop” its
knowledge of
chemical
weapons “and other aspects of its CW capabilities”.
29.
In relation to
Iraq’s biological warfare activity, the Assessment
stated:
•
Iraq had
“never revealed” the full extent of its offensive biological
warfare
programme
to UNSCOM although it had admitted to “laboratory work on
a
range of BW
agents” and that anthrax spores, botulinum toxin and
aflatoxin
were
“produced in bulk”. Bombs and missile warheads had been “filled
with
these
agents immediately prior to the Gulf War”. Iraq had “yet to make a
credible
‘Full,
Final and Complete Declaration’ of BW activity required by the UN”,
and
its claims
that it had “terminated its programme at the end of the Gulf War”
had
“failed to
convince” the UN.
•
The JIC
assessed that Iraq was “likely to have concealed BW
production
equipment,
agent stocks and weapons”.
•
The JIC
continued “to assess that, even without procurement from
abroad,
Iraq has
retained sufficient expertise, equipment and materials to produce
BW
agents
within weeks using its legitimate biotechnology
facilities”.
•
Iraq had
been “trying to procure dual use
materials and equipment which
could be
used for a BW programme”, but it was “impossible to
determine”
whether the
procurement was for a BW programme.
•
There were
indications that, contrary to its claims to have terminated
the
BW
programme at the end of the Gulf War, during the last decade, Iraq
had
continued
to conduct research on a range of biological agents using
personnel
known to
have been connected with the programme before 1991.
•
“A recent
piece of liaison intelligence reported that Iraq had started
to produce
biological
agent in ‘mobile production centres’.”
•
“According
to an Iraqi defector, planning for the project had begun in
1995
under Dr
Rihab Taha … known to have played a central role in Iraq’s
BW
programme.”
There were “reportedly six mobile production centres, with
one
under
construction. As of March 1999, three of these were fully
functional and
work was
under way to enable the production of five unspecified BW
agents.
At one of
these sites, some 20-30 tonnes of primary product were
reportedly
manufactured
over four months.”
14