10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
double‑signature
arrangement with the IIA, but initially ORHA only”. US Treasury
officials
in the US
delegation said that whoever controlled oil revenues controlled the
direction
of reconstruction;
it was not acceptable that the UN should handle Iraq’s
budget.
250.
Mr Cannon
did not report any UK response to those arguments.
251.
Mr Straw’s
office sent Mr Rycroft an IPU brief on 7 April, for
Mr Blair to use at the
Hillsborough
meeting.130
The IPU
advised:
“We agree
that, as Condi [Dr Rice] said at Camp David, future oil
arrangements
should be
put into the hands of Iraqis, with international oversight, as soon
as
possible.
But it is
unrealistic to think that the UN Security Council,
which
controls
Iraq’s oil revenues, will agree to give directional power over
them
to the
Coalition. It will need
a new UNSCR to take control over the revenues from
the UN and
give it to someone else. We don’t think that IIA should have
unfettered
power over
spending. We need to design a system where the IFIs have
sufficient
oversight
of the IIA’s activities for us to have confidence. We won’t get
UNSCR
agreement
to Jay Garner’s signature – in any circs.”
252.
Section 9.1
describes the discussions at Hillsborough between Mr Blair
and
President
Bush on 7 and 8 April, which focused on the role of the UN in
post-conflict
Iraq.
253.
During the
meeting, Dr Rice said that the US and UK needed to divide
what
had to be
done by the Occupying Power, from what could be left to a future
Iraqi
Government.131
On oil,
short-term tasks for the Coalition should include: repairing
the
oilfields;
getting Iraqis back to work; and starting to pump oil. The
long-term issues
would include
future contracts.
254.
Mr Straw
said that a UN role would be needed to regularise the sale of Iraqi
oil.
255.
General Franks
issued his “Freedom Message to the Iraqi People” on 16
April.132
The message
referred to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
256.
The creation
of the CPA, which subsumed ORHA, signalled a major change
in
the US
approach to Iraq, from a short military occupation to an extended
US-led civil
administration.
257.
On 24 April,
the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
(AHMGIR)
considered
an IPU/FCO paper entitled ‘Oil/Energy Policy for
Iraq’.133
The paper
stated
that it was
a “stock-take” which built on previous work by the
IPU.134
130
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 7 April 2003, ‘Hillsborough: Iraq’ attaching Paper IPU,
6 April 2003,
‘Iraq: Phase IV:
Authorising UNSCR’.
131
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 8 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting
with Bush, 7-8 April’.
132
Statement
Franks, 16 April 2003, ‘Freedom Message to the Iraqi
People’.
133
Minutes, 24
April 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
134
Paper IPU,
22 April 2003, ‘Oil/Energy Policy for Iraq’.
411