The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
however,
the operation was ill‑judged. Local political reaction has been
relatively
muted … My
sense though is that, locally, the desire for progress and
transition
remains and
this should motivate them to treat this incident more as a speed
bump
1365.
Mr Bill
Jeffrey, Permanent Under Secretary for the MOD from November
2005
to October
2010, met Maj Gen Shaw during a visit to Iraq from 12 to
13 March.1251
Maj Gen Shaw
reported that the raid on the NIIA offices could “have been
handled
better”,
with hindsight, but that “most reactions by local political figures
were either
somewhat
synthetic or manageable”.
1366.
Maj Gen Shaw
reflected on the raid in his evidence to the
Inquiry.1252
He
said:
“[It] was
the one operation where they [the Iraqi Government] did object to
it … that
raid …
exposed the difficulties within the Shia polity again … It was a
raid carried out
by the
Iraqi special forces, so it was an Iraqi raid and it was trying
very hard to abide
by or
comply with Iraqi sovereignty.”
1367.
On 15 March,
Maj Gen Shaw highlighted the importance of tackling
violence not
directed at
MNF and the difficulties of doing that, saying:
“The
fundamental assumption behind the NIIA raid was that it was
consistent with,
indeed in
pursuit of, Iraqi sovereignty: that the nature of the target (known
death
squad
leader against whom an Iraqi judge had issued an arrest warrant)
and the
method of
arrest (ISOF, not MNF) would bring GoI buy‑in, even though it was
within
a building
owned by the IPS (which PM Maliki … acknowledged to be
corrupt).”1253
1368.
Maj Gen Shaw
reflected on how the NIIA incident illustrated concerns
about
transition:
“It is in
this context … that the NIIA raid needs to be viewed. If we are to
address the
Iraqi
end‑state, our focus needs to be less on the 90 percent violence
against us,
more on the
10 percent reported inter‑Shia/Iraqi violence which threatens
stability
when we are
gone. Tackling death squad leaders … who pose the major
threat
to the
political stability of Basra, is the most useful application of
military force to
support the
political end‑state …
“My
short‑term concern is that the issue blights transition … A line
needs to be
drawn under
this operation in the interest of achieving Iraqi self‑reliance …
My
long‑term
concerns centre around the defining impact these investigations
will
1250
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 8 March 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 8 March
2007’.
1251
Minute
PS/PUS [MOD] to PS/SofS [MOD], 16 March 2007, ‘PUS Visit to
Multinational Division
South‑East,
12 March 2007’.
1252
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 17‑18.
1253
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 15 March 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 15
March 2007’.
372