9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
his own far
more positive and constructive views. Some of this, particularly
the last
bit, is
clearly heartfelt. But much of it may also be linked to the issue
of releases,
which is
the subject that, until the threat to JAM in Basra, was the one
that inspired
most heat
and emotion in our meetings. On the other hand he still talks
bitterly about
the
‘occupation’ and did not yet seem completely free of the dread
inspired by the
prospect of
Najaf’s disfavour.”
640.
On 29
November, Mr Prentice reported that a US/Iraqi bilateral
Statement of
Intent
about a long-term military, security and economic relationship had
been signed
by
President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki on 26
November.296
This
included a firm
US
commitment to the Iraqi Government that the next resolution would
be the final one
under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
641.
Mr Prentice
advised that the next step would be negotiation of the resolution
and
the
accompanying letter from the Iraqi Government formally requesting
the extension
of the
MNF-I mandate. Mr Zebari had already said publicly that the
letter would be
submitted
to the Iraqi Council of Representatives for approval. On the basis
of the length
of time it
had taken to negotiate the US/Iraqi Statement of Intent,
Mr Prentice considered
it likely
that negotiations would go “to the wire”.
642.
The timeframe
for negotiating long-term security agreements was a longer
one
and
Mr Prentice thought it unlikely that talks would begin before
the New Year. He
commented
that the UK would soon need to decide how best to frame the “new
legal
base for UK
forces’ presence and activity in Iraq post-2008” and also whether
the UK
preferred
its interests to be covered in relevant parts of the US-Iraq
agreement or to
negotiate
its own agreement.
643.
Several senior
Iraqi politicians had already expressed the hope that the UK
would
want to
build on the “positive and much appreciated” role it had played in
founding the
new Iraq,
and that it would be natural for the new relationship to be
expressed in a
UK‑Iraq
bilateral agreement.
644.
In early
December, Ambassador John Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of
State,
and
Ambassador David Satterfield, State Department Co-ordinator for
Iraq, travelled
to Iraq to
lead negotiations on the new resolution.297
Mr Prentice
stressed the need for
transparency
and consultation on both the resolution and the accompanying
letters.
645.
Mr Prentice
reported that although Prime Minister Maliki had agreed that
there
should be
no change in the operative paragraphs of the resolution, he wished
to
296
eGram
48777/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 29 November 2007, ‘Iraq: the US/GOI
Partnership
Declaration
and the UNSCR’.
297
eGram
49070/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 3 December 2007, ‘Iraq: UNSCR
Renewal Negotiations’.
301