15.1 | Civilian
personnel
11.
ORHA was
created by the US in January 2003.3
It was led by
retired US Lieutenant
General Jay
Garner and reported to the Department of Defense
(DoD).
12.
The UK’s
approach to ORHA in the weeks before the invasion of Iraq is
described
in Section
6.5. UK concerns during that period included:
•
DoD’s
assumption of responsibility for all US post‑conflict planning and
the
marginalisation
of the State Department;
•
the limited
time available to ORHA to plan and prepare for the
post‑conflict
phase of
operations;
•
persistent
shortcomings in those preparations;
•
legal
concerns, in the absence of a UN mandate for the administration
and
reconstruction
of Iraq, about the compatibility of certain post‑conflict
activities
with the
rules of military occupation, and the implications for any UK
secondees
serving
with ORHA; and
•
a shortage
of information about ORHA’s staffing requirements and, as
a
consequence,
the contribution that should be made by the UK.
13.
The UK
Government’s response to those concerns and the evolution of its
policy
towards
ORHA during March and April 2003 are addressed in Sections 6.5 and
10.1.
14.
In February
2003, the Government seconded a small number of officials and
military
officers to
ORHA. The Inquiry has seen little evidence of formal
inter‑departmental
discussion
of the appointment process.
15.
The first UK
secondee, appointed in February 2003, and the senior UK member
of
ORHA was
Major General Tim Cross.4
16.
Maj
Gen Cross had recent and relevant experience of planning for
conflict in Iraq.
In the
second half of 2002 he had worked as Logistic Component Commander
of the
Joint Force
being prepared for possible operations against Iraq. He returned to
the UK
in late
2002.
17.
Maj Gen Cross
told the Inquiry:
“I had been
back only a short time at my desk, where I was the Director General
of
the defence
supply chain, a couple of weeks and the phone rang literally out of
the
blue, and
they5
just said
we want you to go. To be honest, I wasn’t
surprised.” 6
3
Bowen SW
Jr., Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing Office,
2009.
4
Statement
Cross, 2009, pages 6‑7.
5
Maj Gen Cross
was unsure whether he had been phoned by the Military Secretary
(Major General
Peter Grant
Peterkin) or the Chief of the General Staff (General Sir Mike
Jackson).
6
Public
hearing, 7 December 2009, page 10.
247