15.1 | Civilian
personnel
have taken
that opportunity to disengage with Basra. Instead we recognised
that we
could take
advantage of the improving security situation …”
559.
The UK handed
over the command of MND(SE) to the US on 31 March.370
560.
An
unattributed FCO review of lessons to be learned from the UK’s
experience
in Basra
from late 2008 included a number of observations on civilian
personnel:
•
“FCO (and
other civilian departments) need to build on the frameworks for
risk
ownership
and management which have been put in place over the last
five
years to
allow maximum operational flexibility on the ground consistent with
our
duty of
care, including through the provision at an early stage in the
deployment
of
protective assts eg armoured transport.”
•
“The FCO
was unprepared for the sort of operation that was to be
undertaken,
with the
result that, in the early stages (but almost six months after the
invasion)
FCO staff
were being sent into the field without computers,
communication
equipment,
satisfactory communications arrangements (personal email
accounts
were used
throughout, though some classified communications
became
available
during 2004) and so on. Their military and DFID counterparts
were
better
provided for.” 371
561.
Between 2003
and 2009, departments faced a range of difficulties
recruiting
sufficient
volunteers with the right skills and experience for civilian roles
in Iraq.
Problems
included:
•
the absence
of an established co‑ordinating mechanism for UK
civilian
recruitment;
•
the absence
of a deployable reserve of experts in post‑conflict stabilisation
and
reconstruction;
•
a shortage
of Arabic speakers;
•
imprecise
and changing job descriptions;
•
high
turnover of staff on short deployments;
•
delays
caused by pre‑deployment training;
•
concerns
among potential volunteers, their families and friends
about
deteriorating
security;
•
extraction
of volunteers from existing jobs;
•
negative
perceptions of the career impact of a posting to Iraq;
370
Minute
Johnstone to PS/SofS [MOD], 1 April 2009, ‘CDS visit to Iraq
(Basra) to attend the MND(SE)
transfer of
authority ceremony – 31 Mar 09’.
371
Paper
[FCO], [undated], ‘Iraq: What Went Wrong in Basra?’ attaching
Paper, ‘Reflections on Basra and
the lessons
to be learned from the FCO’s experience in Iraq’.
343