9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
and
prominent at all levels of ORHA” and “unless the scoping study
concludes that this
is
impossible” a UK-led ORHA regional office.
217.
Steps to
increase UK support for ORHA are described in more detail
in
Section
10.1.
218.
On 16 April,
Gen Franks issued his ‘Freedom Message to the Iraqi
People’.109
The
message
stated:
“Our stay
in Iraq will be temporary, no longer than it takes to eliminate the
threat
posed by
Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, and to establish
stability
and help
Iraqis form a functioning government that respects the rule of law
and
reflects
the will, interests, and rights of the people of Iraq.
“Meanwhile,
it is essential that Iraq have an authority to protect lives and
property,
and
expedite the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those who need
it.
Therefore,
I am creating the Coalition Provisional Authority to exercise
powers of
government
temporarily, and as necessary, especially to provide security, to
allow
the
delivery of humanitarian aid and to eliminate weapons of mass
destruction.”
219.
Gen Franks’
Freedom Message also contained the first public statement about
the
treatment
of the Ba’ath Party:
“The Arab
Socialist Renaissance Party of Iraq (Hizb al-Ba’ath al-Arabi
al-Ishtiraki
al-Iraqi)
is hereby disestablished. Property of the Ba’ath Party should be
turned
over to the
Coalition Provisional Authority. The records of the Ba’ath Party
are an
important
part of the records of the Government of Iraq and should be
preserved.
All those
with custody of the records of the Ba’ath Party or the Government
of Iraq
should …
turn them over to the Coalition Provisional
Authority.”
220.
The policy of
de-Ba’athification and its implications is considered in Section
11.
Gen Franks
issued orders on 16 April to withdraw US war-fighting units within
60 days and
to use the
incoming US forces for only up to 120 days, reducing the US
military presence
in Iraq
from 175,000 troops to 30,000 by the start of
August.110
Lieutenant
General Ricardo Sanchez, Commander of Combined Joint Task Force – 7
from
15 June
(see Box, ‘US command structures and the SBMR-I’), recalled that
Gen Franks
“explicitly
stated that military leaders should take as much risk coming out of
Iraq as we
did going
in – which meant that we were going to try to get by with the
smallest number
of ground
troops possible”.
109
Statement
Franks, 16 April 2003, ‘Freedom Message to the Iraqi
People’.
110
Sanchez RS
& Phillips DT. Wiser in
Battle: A Soldier’s Story. HarperCollins,
2008.
165