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3.2  |  Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to Crawford
704.  Mr Rycroft added that Mr Blair would have seen the advice he had received from
the Defence and Foreign Secretaries as “caution verging on sort of unnecessarily
pessimistic”.272
Mr Blair’s evidence
705.  Mr Blair set out his position on the preparations for Crawford and the
position he adopted in his discussions with President Bush in his evidence
to the Inquiry in 2010 and 2011, and in his memoir in 2010.
706.  Mr Blair told the Inquiry that, after the Cabinet Office ‘Options Paper’ in March
2002, there were “a whole series of government discussions about smart sanctions”.273
707.  Asked how the options on Iraq had been identified and reviewed, Mr Blair told the
Inquiry that a decision had been taken after 11 September:
“… that this issue had to be confronted … It could be confronted by an effective
sanctions framework. It could be confronted by Saddam allowing the inspectors
back in to do their work properly and compliance with the UN resolutions, or, in the
final analysis … if sanctions could not contain him and he was not prepared to allow
the inspectors back in, then the option of removing Saddam was there.”274
708.  Asked whether he had had a meeting to discuss the ‘Options Paper’ and take
decisions on it, Mr Blair told the Inquiry he had talked to Mr Straw and Mr Hoon, there
had been a meeting of “the key people to decide where we were then going to go”, and
the meeting at Chequers had been a “very structured debate”.275
709.  Mr Blair confirmed that the ‘Options Paper’ had not been discussed in Cabinet.276
710.  Mr Blair subsequently told the Inquiry:
“Well, the ‘Options Paper’ really said two things. It said you can either go for
containment. We can’t guarantee that that’s successful. He will probably continue
to develop his programmes and be a threat, but nonetheless that is one option. The
other option is regime change.”277
711.  Mr Blair added:
“… there’s nothing in those papers … that wasn’t surfaced as part of the discussion
… [which] all the way through was: what is the judgment? … That was certainly part
of the discussion that was going on in Cabinet. Now you can say, and I would be
perfectly happy if you did say, look it is better to disclose all those or give everybody
272  Private hearing, 10 September 2010, pages 12-13.
273  Public hearing, 29 January 2010, page 14.
274  Public hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 18-19.
275  Public hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 21-22.
276  Public hearing, 29 January 2010, page 23.
277  Public hearing, 21 January 2011, page 12.
517
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