The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
295.
On 30 March,
Sir David Manning sent a minute to Mr Blair setting out his
thoughts
10 days
into the conflict, “for what they are worth”.175
He
wrote:
“As you
said at Camp David, much has been achieved. We need to keep our
nerve.
But we also
need to accept that the war is not working out as advertised, and
adjust
accordingly.
“Saddam is
apparently still in place; and the Iraqis are fighting effectively.
This
is not the
war the military expected. We need a strategy for dealing with
the
Fedayeen phenomenon.
CDS says Franks will take these units out one by one.
But
how does he
intend to identify them? … We [the Coalition] are also short of men
[…]
We now have
thousands of troops still on their way through the Red Sea [the US
4th
Infantry
Division].”
296.
Addressing the
risks as he saw them, Sir David wrote:
“Franks
will launch his delayed and much hyped Army Group offensive later
this
week. But
what sort of offensive will it be if the Iraqis refuse the roles
allocated to
them …?
Will pulverising attacks be possible on the Medina and Baghdad
Divisions
if they
avoid fighting in massed units in the open, instead concentrating
in heavily
populated,
built up areas?
“Franks’
focus remains Baghdad. Whatever the outcome of the imminent
offensive,
he [General
Franks] seems determined to deliver the prize [Baghdad] to Bush
and
Rumsfeld
within four to six weeks … The plan to divide Baghdad into forty or
fifty
sectors and
clear them out one by one could turn into a nightmare and give
Saddam
his
Stalingrad. I think you should demand an early review of this
strategy. I think
it
risks
losing us the war rather than winning it.”
297.
Addressing the
military priorities, Sir David advised:
“All this
makes me think we should:
•
ask the
military for a detailed account of how they will now adapt
the
campaign to
the Iraqi guerrilla war of hit and run;
•
ask for a
detailed analysis of Franks’ planned big offensive … How
severe
will
collateral damage be if the Medina and Baghdad Divisions are
in
urban areas?
•
put plans
for Baghdad on hold, while we focus on Basra. We should
reject
the
argument that if Baghdad falls so will Basra but that the reverse
does not
apply …
Baghdad is unlikely to fall quickly. But Basra might. Success
there
would send
shock waves through the Iraqi system that could destabilise
the
regime.
This could in turn give us a better chance of taking Baghdad
with
minimum
loss of life. The question is whether it now makes sense for
the
175
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 30 March 2003, ‘The Iraq War: Ten Days
In’.
50