6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
536.
On the scope
of representative government, the paper stated:
“Some
Americans have openly stated they want to see the establishment
of
democracy.
We have avoided this position, because it is an unrealistic
ambition in
the short
term.”
537.
Even if
democracy were not a short-term option, presentationally it would
be
important
for the international community to show that intervention was
leading to better
government.
Difficult issues included:
•
Iraq had no
successful experience of representative or democratic
government.
•
A
democratic Iraq would not necessarily be pro-Western.
•
The Sunni
minority would probably feel threatened by a more
representative
system.
•
External
opposition was weak and probably lacked sufficient legitimacy in
Iraq
to be
credible.
•
None of
Iraq’s neighbours would be keen to see a democratic
Iraq.
“To the
extent possible, the Iraqis themselves should have the primary role
in
determining
their future government and external intervention should appear
to
come from
within the Arab world or the UN – perhaps through an
international
conference
(but the Afghanistan model is not necessarily
relevant).”
539.
Because of the
likely delay in putting in place longer term arrangements,
the
international
community was likely to need to establish and provide staff for an
interim
administration:
“This would
need to be set up quickly and on a large scale. It would maintain
stability
and provide
basic services such as food rationing. It should probably have a
UN
mandate and
would need strong support and participation from Arab
countries.
There are
various models which could be adopted or drawn on, including
the
transitional
administrations in Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor and
Kosovo.
We should
start exploring what would be appropriate in the Iraqi
context.”
540.
The FCO
concluded that, in order to achieve its overarching priorities, the
UK
should:
•
argue
strongly for Iraq to remain a unitary state;
•
“if
possible avoid the root and branch dismantling of Iraq’s
governmental and
security
structures”;
•
accept that
the political situation after Saddam Hussein’s departure
would
“almost
certainly be messy and unstable”, that a new government “will
possibly
be
military” and that “we should argue for political reform, but not
necessarily full
democracy
in the short term”;
203