The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“If and
when” there was Iraqi movement, which would “presumably only
be
under the
pressure of US military preparations, the dynamics of the
Council
would mean
that efforts to restart political talks would quickly
resume”.
•
It was not
“clear that the US would allow … an ultimatum to be put
forward”.
They had
rejected such an approach over Iraq in 1998 and Kosovo in
1999.
•
Russia and
China would “definitely” reject an ultimatum; they knew “full well
that
it could be
used to justify military action which they do not
support”.
•
Sir Jeremy
did not “entirely discount bringing the Council round if we played
our
cards
cleverly”.
•
The
prospects for getting Russia, China and others on board “would
be
dramatically
strengthened if we could catch the Iraqis with their pants down
in
some
dramatic way”. The “main obstacle … might actually be the
Americans,
who will
not wish to be caught even asking the question”.
293.
Sir Jeremy
advised that there was “a lot to be said for considering additional
UN
routes to
put pressure on Iraq”. These could include revisiting the idea of a
travel ban for
senior
Iraqis or proposing new measures to screen Iraq’s borders. Such
proposals were
“likely to
fail” but would “help us demonstrate that we have tried to use the
UN route.
And in
the event that such proposals do succeed, we benefit from increased
pressure
on the
Iraqi regime. We would also buy time.”
294.
The UK would
also need:
“… to do
more to convince Security Council colleagues and others that
Saddam
represents
a clear and present danger. More WMD briefings at capitals is one
way
forward. I
know we have been through this countless times, but we never seem
to
be able to
hit the point of real conviction.”
295.
Finally, Sir
Jeremy emphasised that the legality of military action was “one of
the
most
difficult questions we are asked”. The UK Permanent Mission to the
UN in New
York could
“avoid such questions” when military action was
“theoretical”:
“But taking
military action against Iraq when our claims to legality are
rejected by
a large
percentage of UN members is going to damage our multilateral image,
our
CT [counter
terrorism] credentials and our own electability in the UN system
quite
severely”.
296.
Sir Jeremy’s
letter was intended to inform the discussion on 23 July, and
copies
were sent
by Mr Ricketts to the Cabinet Office and the MOD.
297.
The letter was
also seen by Lord Goldsmith.121
121
Manuscript
comments Goldsmith on Letter Greenstock to Ricketts, 19 July 2002,
‘Iraq at the UN’.
52