The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
384.
Sir David
Manning sent a copy to Dr Rice on 14 February.182
He explained
that
the UK
military campaign objectives were “compatible but not identical” to
‘Iraq: Goals,
Objectives,
Strategy’ (the US document handed to Sir David by Dr Rice on 31
January).
385.
Sir David
explained that the UK and US were committed to ridding Iraq of
WMD
and
recognised the need to remove the current Iraqi regime if military
action proved
necessary,
but the UK document avoided references to “liberation”. No firm
decision had
been taken,
but the likelihood was that the UK would publish its objectives if
and when
military
action was decided.
386.
A final
version of the military campaign objectives, with changes to the
introductory
paragraphs
(reflecting the outcome of negotiations in the UN Security Council)
but not
to the
objectives themselves, was placed in the Library of the House of
Commons by
Mr Hoon
on 20 March.
387.
In a speech
on 11 February, Mr Straw explained that the UK’s first
objective
in Iraq was
disarmament. The next priority was to work with the UN to help
the
Iraqi
people recover.
388.
In a speech at
the International Institute for Strategic Studies on 11
February,
Mr Straw
stated that if military action did prove necessary, “huge efforts”
would be
made “to
ensure that the suffering of the Iraqi people” was “as limited as
is possible”.183
They
deserved “the chance to live fulfilling lives free from the
oppression and terror
of Saddam”;
and to “choose their own destiny and government, and to pursue
a
prosperous
life within a safe environment”. The UK’s first objective was
disarmament,
but the
“next priority would be to work with the United Nations to help the
Iraqi people
recover …
and allow their country to move towards one that is ruled by law,
respects
international
obligations and provides effective and representative
government”.
389.
Mr Blair
convened two Ministerial meetings on post-conflict issues
in
February
and March 2003. The first, on 13 February, covered the
specific
question of
humanitarian assistance. The second, on 6 March, addressed
wider
post‑conflict
issues and is addressed later in this Section.
390.
At the
meeting on 13 February, Mr Blair listed three UK
post-conflict
priorities:
•
that the UN
“must play a key role”, which he did not define;
•
a UK lead
on humanitarian issues in southern Iraq; and
•
mobilisation
of other contributors.
182
Letter
Manning to Rice, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign
Objectives’.
183
The
Guardian, 11
February 2003, The Foreign
Secretary’s address to the International Institute for
Strategic
Studies.
376