The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
862.
In the ‘Scope
Note’ introducing The
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor
to the DCI on
Iraq’s WMD (the ISG
Comprehensive Report), Mr Duelfer stated that
the Report
covered the ISG’s findings between June 2003 and September
2004.481
Since there
remained “the possibility (though small) of remaining WMD”, reports
of
WMD-related
material in the future would continue to be
investigated.
863.
The
Comprehensive Report was divided into six sections, each opening
with a
summary of
key findings.482
Those
included:
Regime
Strategic Intent:
•
“Saddam
Hussein so dominated the Iraqi regime that its strategic
intent
was his
alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the
capability
to
reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when
sanctions
were
lifted.”
•
“Saddam
wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability – which was
essentially
destroyed
in 1991 – after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s
economy
stabilized,
but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that
which
previously
existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability –
in
an
incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and
the
resulting
economic risks – but he intended to focus on ballistic
missile
and tactical
chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.”
Regime
Finance and Procurement:
•
“Saddam
directed the regime’s key ministries and governmental agencies
to
devise and
implement strategies, policies and techniques to discredit the
UN
sanctions,
harass UN personnel in Iraq, and discredit the US. At the same
time,
according
to reporting, he also wanted to obfuscate Iraq’s refusal to
reveal
the nature
of its WMD and WMD-related programs, their capabilities, and
his
intentions.”
•
“Iraq under
Saddam successfully devised various methods to acquire and
import
items
prohibited under UN sanctions …”
Delivery
Systems:
•
“Desert
Storm and subsequent UN resolutions and inspections
brought
many of
Iraq’s delivery programs to a halt.”
•
“While
other WMD programs were strictly prohibited, the UN permitted Iraq
to
develop and
possess delivery systems provided their range did not
exceed
150km. This
freedom allowed Iraq to keep its scientists and
technicians
481
Central
Intelligence Agency, 30 September 2004, The
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to
the DCI on
Iraq’s WMD, Volume I,
‘Scope Note’.
482
Central
Intelligence Agency, 30 September 2004, The
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to
the DCI on
Iraq’s WMD.
596