The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
727.
Four months
later, on 12 July, the UK assumed military responsibility
for
four provinces.
728.
For the
next six years, the UK was responsible for maintaining security
in
those
provinces, initially as an Occupying Power and, from June 2004, in
support
of the
Iraqi Government.
729.
Sections
6.4 and 6.5 consider the reasons for the Government’s failure
to
prepare a
flexible, realistic and fully resourced post-conflict plan
integrating UK
civilian
and military resources in a single national effort.
730.
The process
leading to the creation of the UK AOR followed that
pattern,
even after
the creation of the AHMGIR.
731.
Section
10.1 considers the impact of the AHMGIR in greater
detail.
732.
The military
plan for the invasion of Iraq depended for success on a rapid
advance
on Baghdad,
including convincing the Iraqi population of the Coalition’s
determination to
remove the
regime.
733.
By the end of
March, the Government had recognised the need for
sustained
communication
of key strategic messages and improved capabilities to reach a
range of
audiences
in the UK, Iraq and the wider international community. But there
was clearly
a need
for more robust arrangements to integrate Coalition efforts in the
UK, US and
the forces
deployed in Iraq.
734.
The reaction
of the media and the Iraqi population to perceived
difficulties
encountered
within days of the start of an operation, which was planned to last
up to
125 days,
might have been anticipated if there had been more rigorous
examination
of possible
scenarios pre-conflict and the media had better understood the
original
concept of
operations and the nature of the Coalition responses to the
situations they
encountered
once the campaign began.
735.
The difficulty
and complexity of successfully delivering distinct strategic
messages
to each of
the audiences a government needs to reach should not be
underestimated.
For any
future military operations, arrangements tailored to meet the
circumstances
of each
operation need to be put in place in both London and on the ground
before
operations
begin.
736.
When the UK
acceded to the US request that it assume leadership of a
military
Area of
Responsibility (AOR) encompassing four provinces in southern Iraq,
it did so
without a
robust analysis either of the strategic implications for the UK or
of the military’s
capacity to
support the UK’s potential obligations in the region.
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