6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
•
the impact
of UK decisions on the Coalition; and
•
a draft
letter to Mr Alan Milburn, the Health Secretary, on the impact
on the
National
Health Service.311
787.
Mr Hoon
wrote to Mr Blair on 15 October, seeking a decision that week
on whether
to tell the
US they could assume a UK land contribution in addition to the air,
maritime
and Special
Forces package already offered for planning
purposes.312
In any
event,
there would
be a need to be more robust in public about the need for essential
military
preparation.
788.
In the context
of the potential US timetable, and the need to maintain pressure
on
Saddam
Hussein, Mr Hoon added:
“Indeed,
Saddam has conceded ground so far only because diplomacy has
been
backed by
the credible threat of force. We must maintain and reinforce this
effect.”
789.
The reasons
for urgency included:
•
a week‑long
CENTCOM conference, which started that day, during which
the
US military
wanted to finalise their plans;
•
discussions
with Turkey; and
•
the need to
start visible preparations, including the call‑up of
Reserves.
790.
Mr Hoon
told Mr Blair that either Package 2 or Package 3 “would be a
viable
military
contribution”, but in describing the Packages, Mr Hoon
added:
•
The number
of visible “boots on the ground” in Package 2 would be
“small”,
which
“could lead to some criticism here and elsewhere that UK support
for
the
operation was half‑hearted. The US may be disappointed that we are
not
offering
more; the likely political reaction is more difficult to judge
…”
•
Package 3
would provide a “major element of the northern line of attack”,
which
was judged
“essential”. Without UK land forces, the US would have to
redeploy
its forces
from the South. UK forces “could therefore help both to shorten
the
campaign
and secure a more decisive outcome”.
•
Package 3
“would have more impact” and “might provide a framework
for
integrating
elements from other countries into a land force”.
•
“There was
“likely to be a substantial and continuing post‑conflict
stabilisation task
in Iraq”.
If the UK did not contribute Package 3, it might be “more
vulnerable to a
US request
to provide a substantial force for this potentially open‑ended
task”.
311
Minute
Williams to Head of Sec(Iraq), 14 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK
Contingency Planning’.
312
Minute Hoon
to Prime Minister, 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military Options’
attaching Paper Ministry
of Defence,
14 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Contingency Planning’.
295