9.4  |  June 2005 to May 2006

577.  The British Embassy Washington reported on 23 February that President Bush had

strongly condemned the al-Askari attack.282 His statement also urged the Iraqi people to

exercise restraint, and “to pursue justice in accordance with the laws and Constitution

of Iraq”.

578.  An official from the National Security Council had told Embassy officials:

“Notwithstanding blanket US media coverage depicting imminent civil war, the

Administration were reserving judgement on whether counter-attacks on Sunni

mosques and demonstration represented a total breakdown along sectarian

lines. The conduct of Friday prayers could be a litmus test of which way

events would turn.”

579.  The JIC reviewed the state of the jihad in Iraq on 23 February.283 It recorded that

the number of suicide bombings in Iraq had fallen by 25 percent since October, but did

not know why.

580.  The JIC’s Key Judgements included:

“II. al-Zarqawi’s Al Qaida in Iraq (AQ-I) and other jihadist groups remain a potent,

confident force with proven resilience …

“III. Jihadist groups are now predominantly Iraqi and Iraqi-led. Increasing numbers of

Iraqis are becoming suicide bombers. Foreign fighters continue to travel to Iraq but

the jihad in Iraq is becoming self-sustaining in manpower, although external funding

is still important.

…

“V. Many Iraqi jihadists (and certainly Zarqawi and most foreign fighters) will never

be reconciled to the current political process. But some of their Iraqi followers might

be, if the new government includes credible Sunni representation and is able to

deliver on at least some Sunni expectations. Conversely, continuing Sunni alienation

will drive the jihadists and nationalists closer together.”

581.  The JIC judged that not all members of the Iraqi jihadist groups were driven by

Islamist extremism:

“… the jihadist message of uncompromising resistance to ‘occupation’ and a

government perceived as dominated by Shia and Iran resonates strongly with

many Sunnis. The activities of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) security forces, widely

believed by Sunnis to be behind a campaign of sectarian assassinations, and

the human rights abuses revealed at the MOI detention centres, have served to

increase support.”

282  eGram 3812/06 Washington to FCO London, 23 February 2006, ‘Iraq: Attack on the Al-Askariya Shrine:

US Reactions’.

283  JIC Assessment, 23 February 2006, ‘The State of the Jihad in Iraq’.

585